

Is Private Investment in Agriculture the Solution? An Evaluation of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Senegal

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About the FSPG: A coalition of Canada's leading development and agricultural organizations concerned with global food security, including Aga Khan Foundation Canada, Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, Canadian Council for International Co-operation, Canadian Feed the Children, Canadian Foodgrains Bank, Canadian Hunger Foundation, Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief, Canadian Red Cross, CARE Canada, ETC Group, Farm Radio International, Huairou Commission, Inter Pares, Mennonite Central Committee Canada, National Farmers Union, Oxfam Canada, Oxfam Québec, Plan Canada, Results-Resultats Canada, Save the Children Canada, United Church of Canada, UPA Développement international, USC Canada, World Animal Protection, and World Vision Canada. For more information on the FSPG: http://www.ccic.ca/working_groups/food_e.php

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADUPES	Sustainable Fisheries Management Project
AFE	Action for Enterprise
AFSI	L'Aquila Food Security Initiative
AGRA	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
ANORF	African Network on the Right to Food
APIX	National Agency for the Promotion of Investment and Infrastructure Works
ASPRODEB	Association for the Promotion of Grassroots Development
ASPSP	Senegalese Association of Peasant Seeds Growers
AUC	African Union Commission
BACDI	Canadian Cooperation Support Office
BNDE	National Bank for Economic Development
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CASL	Compagnie agricole de Saint-Louis
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CEO	Chief executive officer
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CLM	Task Force against Malnutrition
CNC	CAADP Non-State Actors Coalition
CNCAS	National Bank for Agricultural Credit
CNRF	National Land Reform Commission
CNCR	National Council for Rural Cooperation
CNES	National Confederation of Employers of Senegal
CNP	National Council of Employers
CNT	Coumba Nor Thiam
CSO	Civil society organization
DAPSA	Department of Analysis, Forward Planning and Statistics
DGPSN	General Delegation of Social Welfare and National Solidarity
DFID	Department for International Development
EAFF	Eastern Africa Farmers Federation
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOWAP	ECOWAS Agricultural Policy
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
FARA	Forum on Agricultural Research in Africa
FONGIP	Priority Investment Guarantee Fund
FONSIS	Sovereign Strategic Investment Fund
GAC	Global Affairs Canada
GAFFSP	Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme
GDP	Gross domestic product
GIE	Economic Interest Groups
GMO	Genetically modified organism
GOANA	Great Agricultural Offensive for Food and Abundance
GODAN	Global Open Data Initiative for Agriculture and Nutrition
ICAI	Independent Commission for Aid Impact
ICT	Information and communications technology
IFAD	International Fund for International Development

IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IRPAD	Institute for Research and the Promotion of Alternatives in Development
ISFSN	Integrated Support to Food Security and Nutrition
ISRA	Senegalese Institute of Agricultural Research
LOI	Letter of intent
MAER	Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Equipment
MCA	Millennium Challenge Account
MI	Micronutrient Initiative
MNC	Multinational corporation
NAFSN	New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition
NAIP	National Agricultural Investment Program
NEPAD	New Economic Partnership for African Development
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PADEN	Programme for Land Use and Economic Development of the Niayes Region
PADEC	Economic Development of Casamance Programme
PDIDAS	Sustainable and Inclusive Agribusiness Project
PINKK	Integrated Nutrition Project for the Kolda and Kedougou Regions
POAS	Communal Land Use Plan
PPP	Public private partnership
PRACAS	Program to Accelerate the Pace of Agriculture in Senegal
PREAC	Program for Reforms of the Business Environment and Competitiveness
PSE	Plan for an Emerging Senegal
ROPPA	West African Network of Peasant and Agricultural Producers' Organizations
SACAU	Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions
SAGCOT	Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor
SAKKS	Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SSTP	Scaling Seeds and Technologies Partnership
SUN	Scaling Up Nutrition
TFP	Technical and funding partner
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAT	Value-added tax
WAAPP	West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
WEF	World Economic Forum
WHO	World Health Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Launched on 18 May 2012, the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN) is a G8 (now G7) initiative spearheaded by former US President Barack Obama. The New Alliance aims to increase private investment in African agriculture as a means to “achieve sustained and inclusive agricultural growth and raise 50 million people out of poverty over the next 10 years.” In total, 10 African countries have signed on to the NAFSN. Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania enrolled in the New Alliance in 2012, while Benin, Malawi, Nigeria, and Senegal joined in 2013.

Almost five years have elapsed since the launch of the NAFSN. Studies on its impacts have begun to appear, and researchers are starting to shed light on the New Alliance’s track record. However, very little of this research has been conducted from a Canadian perspective, leading to a lack of analysis on Canada’s role in the NAFSN. This study addresses this gap through an examination of Canada’s involvement in the NAFSN in Senegal and an assessment of the initiative’s results.

This report is the product of an independent evaluation of the NAFSN in Senegal. Specifically, the research seeks answers to the following questions formulated by the Food Security Policy Group (FSPG): (1) What is Canada’s involvement in the NAFSN? (2) What initiatives have been supported by Canada through the NAFSN? (3) What are the underlying assumptions of the projects funded through the NAFSN? (4) What is the motivation for the Senegalese government and the private sector to engage in the NAFSN? (5) What is the perception of results achieved by Global Affairs Canada (GAC), by Senegal’s government and civil society, by beneficiaries on the ground, and by companies involved? (6) How has the NAFSN in Senegal and other African member countries influenced policies related to land and seed laws? (7) Are there lessons to learn from the NAFSN that can inform policy on private sector and public partnerships using Official Development Assistance (ODA)?

The findings of this study indicate that Canada’s role has been pivotal in launching the NAFSN in Senegal. Under the New Alliance, Canada has mostly targeted its support to the Senegalese government and has accompanied the latter in drafting documents and convening meetings. Canada does not seem to have directly influenced the specific orientation of the NAFSN in that country. The Canadian team’s involvement in the initiative was significant at first, but it has progressively declined due to external factors.

Canada’s financial help under the NAFSN falls into three categories: agricultural programs; budgetary support; and logistical assistance. Canada renewed or approved most of its flagship programs related to agricultural development and food security in Senegal between 2009 and 2012. Even if they were launched before 2013, these projects have been counted toward Canada’s financial pledges to the New Alliance. In addition, Canada has recently made the release of its budgetary support conditional on the Senegalese government fulfilling a number of objectives delineated in its NAFSN Cooperation Framework. Finally, Canada has financed the organization of various workshops and the hiring of external consultants to help the Senegalese government meet its NAFSN commitments. Despite the new priorities, Canada has not increased spending for official development assistance in Senegal in response to the New Alliance.

Companies that participate in the NAFSN do not receive direct financial support from Canada (or other donors for that matter). Canada did not take part in the process to select New Alliance private partners; this task was devolved to Monitor Deloitte, a consulting firm paid by USAID. There are seemingly no clear guidelines that motivated the choice of domestic and international private partners participating in the New Alliance in Senegal. The goal was rather to recruit as many enterprises as possible.

Stakeholders who agreed to join the New Alliance initially had high expectations for the initiative. Overall, the New Alliance is in line with the Senegalese government's vision of agriculture. Indeed, since the 2000s, the leitmotif of the Senegalese state has been that agricultural development is to be achieved through increased private investment, although family farms must be preserved. In addition, Senegal did not want to be excluded from a G7 initiative that seemed major at the time. For their part, private partners in Senegal hoped that involvement in the New Alliance would help them increase their political leverage with the Senegalese government, improve their corporate visibility, and establish commercial partnerships.

The momentum that the New Alliance was able to gather at the outset gradually withered away. Most stakeholders and observers, be they opponents or proponents of the NAFSN, consider the tangible results that have been achieved in Senegal to be below expectations thus far. Assessment of the program reveals a shared sense of disappointment and lack of ownership. The Senegalese government is now also less prone to highlight the NAFSN in its activities. Canada is one of the few actors that speaks positively about the New Alliance in Senegal. Canadian officials hold that, in the short term, the NAFSN has allowed the Senegalese government to assemble previously dispersed measures and programs into a coherent policy framework. In the long run, they contend that the New Alliance has set into motion a process of structural change that will yield results incrementally.

A number of researchers and NGOs argue that the New Alliance forces African countries to liberalize their seed and land sectors to the profit of agribusiness. The deleterious impacts for which the NAFSN has been criticized in other countries are not seen in Senegal. In this country, the NAFSN focuses on the production of seeds certified by a governmental agency but does not prohibit the use and exchange of peasant seeds. Also, before the NAFSN was established, Senegal had already initiated a land reform that it would likely have undertaken regardless of the New Alliance. While the New Alliance encourages the implicit homogenization of agricultural policies across participant countries, it is not a binding agreement. African countries display varying levels of interest and involvement in the NAFSN. In brief, the New Alliance represents an additional force promoting private investment in agriculture but is not in itself a determinant instrument of change.

In sum, the New Alliance has not so far delivered on its promises, be it significant reforms conducted by the Senegalese government, increased private investment in agriculture, or improved food security and nutrition. Canadian staff has shown a commitment to make the initiative work, but their dedication has not prevented a gradual loss of interest in the NAFSN by its primary stakeholders. Against this background, a fruitful avenue to consider for Canada is to enlarge its existing work with smallholders through agricultural aid programs and to maintain the platform of exchanges created for civil society organizations in the context of the New Alliance.

INTRODUCTION

Launched in May 2012, the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN) is a G8 (now G7)¹ initiative spearheaded by former US President Barack Obama. The New Alliance aims to increase private investment in African agriculture as a means to “achieve sustained and inclusive agricultural growth and raise 50 million people out of poverty over the next 10 years [...]”² In total, 10 African countries have signed on to the NAFSN. Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania enrolled in the New Alliance in 2012, while Benin, Malawi, Nigeria, and Senegal joined in 2013.

Almost five years have elapsed since the launch of the NAFSN. Studies on its impacts have begun to appear, and researchers are beginning to shed light on the initiative’s track record. However, very little of this research has been conducted from a Canadian perspective, leading to a lack of analysis on Canada’s role in the NAFSN, as well as on the achievement of its stated goals. This study will address this gap through an examination of Canada’s involvement in the NAFSN in Senegal.

This research focuses on Senegal given that Canada is Senegal’s NAFSN lead partner, and has committed significant support to Senegal under the NAFSN agreement.³ Senegal publicly announced its commitment to participate in the NAFSN on June 8, 2013. On the same day, Canada also indicated in a press release that it would take a “leadership role” to assist Senegal in becoming a member of the New Alliance.⁴ Canada promised financial support to the NAFSN in Senegal in the amount of \$80 million for the 2013-2017 period. Despite these new priorities, however, Canada has not increased spending in Senegal in response to the NAFSN.

This report, commissioned by the Food Security Policy Group (FSPG), presents the findings of an independent evaluation of the NAFSN in Senegal. Specifically, the research explores the following questions, defined by the FSPG: (1) What is Canada’s involvement in the NAFSN? (2) What initiatives have been supported by Canada through the NAFSN? (3) What is the motivation for the Senegalese government and the private sector to engage in the NAFSN? (4) What are the underlying assumptions of the projects funded through the NAFSN? (5) What is the perception of results achieved by Global Affairs Canada (GAC), by Senegal’s government and civil society, by beneficiaries on the ground, and by the companies involved? (6) How has the NAFSN in Senegal and other African member countries influenced policies related to land and seed laws? (7) Are there lessons to learn from the NAFSN that can inform policy on private sector and public partnerships using official development assistance (ODA)?

The conclusions of this study are based on original qualitative field research conducted in Senegal and Canada during several months over the course of 2015 and 2016. Three different data-gathering methods were employed. The report first draws on a thorough content analysis of academic publications, NGO reports, press releases, policy documents, and legislative texts related to the NAFSN. Second, information was collected through qualitative interviews with Senegalese, Canadian, and American government officials, Senegalese and foreign private companies, representatives of domestic and international civil society organizations (CSOs), experts, and university professors. The evaluation also included an in-depth impact study of two rice companies participating in the NAFSN in Senegal, based on interviews with agricultural producers,

decentralized authorities and local administrative agents. In total, 50 interviews were conducted with 60 key informants (see Appendix 1 for the list of participants).⁵ Third, the author participated in various workshops and meetings related to food security, agroecology, land issues, rice value chains, and regional agricultural policies. Her observations during these events informed the analysis. (See Appendix 2 for a complete list of the events attended.)

This report begins with an examination of the rationale and goals of the NAFSN. The following section provides an overview of civil society and academic studies that assess the New Alliance. Section 3 discusses the role of Canada in the NAFSN, and section 4 presents the contours of the New Alliance in Senegal, with a focus on stakeholders' expectations and commitments. Section 5 explores the content of the Cooperation Framework and assesses the NAFSN's evaluation process in Senegal. The report concludes with an appraisal of the results that the NAFSN has achieved so far in Senegal and a brief comparison with the initiative's outcomes in other member countries as a means to better understand its regional impacts.

1. RATIONALE, GOALS, AND FUNCTIONING OF THE NAFSN

The global food crisis of 2007-2008 prompted the G7 to intensify its support to improve food security in Africa. At the July 2009 G7 summit in Italy, member governments stepped up previous efforts and launched the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI). To this effect, they pledged \$25.55 billion⁶ over three years to support "sustainable agriculture development, while keeping a strong commitment to ensure adequate emergency food aid assistance" in 26 African countries.⁷ However, only \$6.97 billion out of the total amount earmarked for AFSI actually constituted new funds, and "the pledges represented one-time commitments, not long-term increases."⁸

Another surge in food prices in 2010 and 2011, coupled with a drought in the Horn of Africa in 2011, prompted the creation of the NAFSN. The New Alliance was launched during the G7 summit organized at Camp David in the United States on May 18, 2012, under the leadership of then President Barack Obama. The initiative was also a response to the fact that the G7 countries failed to fully respect L'Aquila's engagements by cutting back on international aid budgets.⁹ In this context, the NAFSN turned to greater involvement of the private sector to supplement both international assistance from donors and expenditures by African governments in the agricultural sector.

Indeed, the NAFSN is based on the premise that public investment alone is insufficient to develop agriculture, even though African governments have recently deployed considerable efforts. The rationale of the NAFSN thus consists of effecting structural changes in African countries' policy environment to attract private investors. In return for policy support, companies are expected to contribute to the achievement of objectives delineated in national plans for the development of agriculture on the basis of a "mutual alignment."¹⁰ Each African member country designs a "Cooperation Framework," outlining the commitments of the host government, aid donors, and private partners, including passages from Letters of Intent (LOIs) crafted by companies.¹¹ These LOIs do not represent binding agreements, but public declarations of objectives.

1.1 A Means to Implement the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme

The New Alliance seeks to expand on policy objectives elaborated in the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), which was launched at the 2003 African Union (AU) Summit in Maputo, Mozambique. CAADP is part of the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), and represents “a pan-African framework – a set of principles and broadly defined strategies to help countries critically review their own situations and identify investment opportunities” in their agricultural sectors.¹² CAADP’s overarching objective is to advance economic development through agriculture. In July 2003, member countries pledged to dedicate “at least 10 percent of national budgetary resources to agriculture and rural development policy implementation within five years”¹³ as well as to reach a 6% increase in agricultural productivity annually. While the Maputo objective was only partially fulfilled, AU countries reiterated their commitment to agricultural development at Malabo in 2014.

To coordinate and execute CAADP in its member countries, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) developed its own regional policy, the ECOWAS Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP), spanning the period from 2006 to 2010. Each country was responsible for designing a National Agricultural Investment Program (NAIP) to implement ECOWAP at the national level. (Senegal adopted its NAIP in February 2010). In December 2016, ECOWAS countries gathered to approve the second generation of ECOWAP. The Statutory Council of Ministers has yet to endorse the document.¹⁴

While building on CAADP, the NAFSN encourages African governments to enact changes in seven areas against which progress is measured: 1) promotion of a business-enabling environment in the form of “infrastructure, tax reforms, and access to finance”; 2) improvements in the production, distribution, and use of inputs; 3) clarification of land and resource rights; 4) implementation of nutrition policies, “including biofortification, fortification, [...] and malnutrition treatment” measures; 5) strengthening of governmental institutions; 6) adoption of resilience and risk management policies; and 7) formulation of “policies that promote efficient and competitive domestic marketing and trading systems.”¹⁵ However, the NAFSN holds that “Each African government decides how to oversee and implement New Alliance commitments in its country.”¹⁶

When the New Alliance was inaugurated, the G7 committed to aligning their assistance “behind country plans” in an effort to respect existing national priorities in Africa. The G7 additionally promised to better coordinate bilateral programs targeted to NAFSN African members in order “to increase efficiencies, reduce transaction burdens, and eliminate redundancies and gaps,” as well as to offer “predictable” funds to recipient countries.¹⁷

1.2 NAFSN’s Institutional Matrix: Leadership Council, Grow Africa, and Enabling Actions

The NAFSN is administered through an “informal” platform called the Leadership Council, created in 2012. The Leadership Council offers “strategic direction and advice,” but “does not provide operational governance.”¹⁸ It gathers African Presidents, heads of donor agencies, chief executive officers (CEOs) of large firms, and representatives of producer organizations. In 2014, the United States and the World Economic Forum (WEF) were the co-conveners of this 30-member council.¹⁹ In 2015, the African Union Commission (AUC) became a permanent co-convener of the Leadership Council. The WEF remained a co-convener in 2015 and 2016.

All countries participating in the NAFSN are also members of Grow Africa. Grow Africa was created in 2011 by the WEF, the AUC, and NEPAD to accelerate “private sector investment in 12 CAADP Partner Countries.”²⁰ The platform receives grants from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the Department for International Development (DFID) in the United Kingdom. Grow Africa provided assistance with the elaboration of LOIs in several NAFSN countries²¹ (though not in Senegal, which formally joined Grow Africa in 2014). Grow Africa does not offer funds to companies once they have signed their letters, but instead helps these companies to structure their messages and deliver them to governments, in order to resolve problems that, in their view, constrict investment.²² Grow Africa also supports the development of value chains,²³ and organizes annual international investment forums that CEOs and governmental officials attend.

The NAFSN is also working to advance a host of “global enabling actions” that are pursued in most African member countries. Notably, the NAFSN supports the Scaling Seeds and Technologies Partnership (SSTP) managed by the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA). The SSTP aims to “increase production of high-quality seeds by 45 percent in three years and ensure that 40 percent more farmers gain access to innovative agricultural technologies”.²⁴ To this end, SSTP has sponsored a “training program of seed industry personnel from Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger [...] in order to build and strengthen seed enterprises.” Through SSTP, AGRA has stepped up its involvement in Senegal with the creation of a partnership with Action for Enterprise (AFE), to help private seed companies expand their distribution network in rural areas.²⁵ (See Appendix 3 for a description of other initiatives).

2. REVIEWS OF THE NAFSN: A MIXED PICTURE

Proponents of public-private partnerships (PPPs) portray the NAFSN as an innovative form of “enlightened capitalism” that helps “catalyze markets to reach the poor.”²⁶ They also regard the Cooperation Frameworks designed under the New Alliance as a successful example of “country ownership.”²⁷ However, the strengths of the NAFSN in the eyes of proponents are perceived as limitations by its critics. According to some analysts, the very precepts on which the New Alliance is predicated offer a reductionist view of agricultural development.²⁸ Several NGOs promoting small-scale agriculture believe that the NAFSN represents an instrument that the G7 employs to boost agribusiness interests and open up new frontiers for capital.²⁹ They are concerned that the NAFSN will not help solve food and malnutrition problems, but instead prompt policy changes in seed, land, and fiscal laws that constrain African countries’ capacity to regulate their agriculture independently.³⁰ NGOs and policy experts are also worried that the NAFSN might discourage family farming, exacerbate pressure on land, and further marginalize women.³¹

This section provides a review of the analyses that have emerged from civil society organizations and academics with regard to the New Alliance. Sections five and six assess the validity of these critiques in the context of Canada’s role in Senegal.

2.1 Agricultural Modernization and Global Expansion of Capitalist Frontiers

The NAFSN is based upon the assumption that “Agricultural transformation is urgently required for Africa.”³² According to its supporters, the NAFSN encourages companies to partake in efforts to

develop agriculture, unlock economic growth, and hence tackle global poverty. White believes the New Alliance offers a unique opportunity to help African countries tap into “private sector flows” and attract foreign direct investments that now outweigh international aid funds in terms of magnitude.³³ In his view, PPPs “seek to marry the comparative advantages of donors and companies in a synergistic way.”³⁴ Companies provide money, technology, and management capacity, while donors help firms adapt to new “development contexts.” As such, PPPs can help African countries modernize their agricultural sectors.

In contrast, the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, thinks that the New Alliance is in fact based on “an outdated model of agricultural development” that attributes food insecurity to low productivity levels “resulting from a lack of irrigation, of mechanisation, and of inputs.”³⁵ McKeon suggests that the NAFSN reinvigorates old concepts that have pervaded development policies for decades. Predicated upon a revamped modernization discourse, the New Alliance’s narrative implies that “‘traditional’ societies must develop or progress into ‘modern’ ones, [...] with little or no role for peasant agriculture and localized food systems.”³⁶ According to opponents, the NAFSN views family agriculture³⁷ as an antiquated farming system, and assumes that the passage from tradition to modernity in the agricultural sector ought to be realized through the achievement of a second “Green Revolution,” which will result in the expansion of productive yields and market integration in the form of effective value chains.

Similarly, Bichard maintains that the NAFSN appears to be a façade to promote private investment in agriculture and render it socially acceptable, rather than a genuine means to improve food security and nutrition in Senegal.³⁸ Such concerns are heightened by the fact that NAFSN Cooperation Frameworks do not define the duties of private partners to respect human rights, “while investors are promised a stable and hospitable investment climate.”³⁹ Many commentators believe that the NAFSN is more likely to consolidate the power of multinational corporations (MNCs) that are already dominant in global markets than to foster family farming and improve food security. In this vein, Patel, Kerr, Shumba, and Dakishoni contend that the New Alliance discursively transforms private investment in agriculture into a “twenty-first century political necessity.”⁴⁰ Others believe the New Alliance denotes the increasing influence of MNCs on the G7.⁴¹ Observing that firms such as Monsanto, Unilever or Syngenta have signed LOIs, ActionAid International considers that the NAFSN represents an instrument that G7 members use to promote the interests of their agribusiness conglomerates and open up new capitalistic frontiers in Africa.⁴² However, according to the NGO One, African firms, including several small-to-medium enterprises, are also responsible for “sizeable investments” under the New Alliance.⁴³

2.2 Interference in Domestic Policies

According to its advocates, the New Alliance conforms to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which stresses the importance of “increasing alignment of aid with partner countries’ priorities.”⁴⁴ White maintains that this is manifested in meetings organized to elaborate Cooperation Frameworks and “bring New Alliance commitments by donors and the private sector into line with country plans.”⁴⁵ He argues that dialogue between the government, private sector, civil society, and aid community builds trust between stakeholders, while also ensuring that the NAFSN is not hijacked by MNCs and does not facilitate land grabs.

However, a number of skeptical analysts have denounced NAFSN's efforts to work with existing country initiatives as disingenuous. To begin with, McKeon questions the relevance of CAADP itself as an apt vehicle for developing agriculture: "CAADP, established as an Africa-owned instrument for defining agricultural priorities and programs, inspired great expectations at the outset. However, it has ended up being oriented towards external aid rather than the mobilisation and effective use of domestic resources".⁴⁶ Patel et al. suggest that, by building upon existing national programs, the G7 simply wanted to avoid being accused of imposing "the will of favored private-sector entities onto African countries," without having the intention to respect their stated priorities.⁴⁷

The New Alliance postulates that, in their current form, public policies on agriculture in Africa are inadequate and need major transformations. While this is a widely shared opinion, recommended solutions and approaches differ. For many, the requirements for governments to "refine policies in order to improve investment opportunities" impose on African countries conditions reminiscent of structural adjustment programs.⁴⁸ Some critics even argue that the New Alliance constitutes a new form of colonialism that exerts undue pressure on African countries⁴⁹ and submits governments to the influence of corporations. For McKeon, the New Alliance "has given agribusiness companies unprecedented access to African decision-makers in a structured platform in which donors have put their weight behind obtaining desired policy changes."⁵⁰ In particular, several experts are concerned about the ways in which the New Alliance may bring about reforms in seed, land, and fiscal laws that strip away African countries' control over their agriculture.⁵¹

Changes in Seed Laws and Marketing of Fertilizers

After gaining independence, most African governments took control over the distribution of agricultural inputs, including seeds and fertilizers. With the introduction of neoliberal measures in the 1980s and 1990s, however, state structures were gradually dismantled, and private operators were tasked with the commercialization of inputs. Some analysts argue that NAFSN projects and policy changes will further deepen the dependence of farmers on the purchase of seeds and fertilizers manufactured by large multinationals.⁵² According to certain estimates, seeds represent the largest sector in terms of overall private investment committed under the New Alliance.⁵³ However, Hong remarks that most NAFSN projects intend to engage smallholder farmers as suppliers of agricultural products rather than customers of inputs.⁵⁴

Critics also observe that 36 NAFSN policy revisions contained in the national Cooperation Frameworks encourage private companies to play a greater role in the commercial production and sale of seeds, particularly hybrid seeds. These revisions may constrain the ability "of farmers to multiply, use, exchange and sell their own seeds."⁵⁵ NGOs also fear that the NAFSN, through its SSTP, will pave the way for the introduction of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in African countries where the technology is currently banned or restricted.⁵⁶ As mentioned, this Partnership is co-sponsored by AGRA, an organization that is open to the adoption of GMOs to increase yields.

Land Reforms and Land Grabs

The NAFSN posits that clear land rights are a prerequisite for private investment in agriculture. Bailey also considers that smallholders can benefit from secure land titles.⁵⁷ A political commitment to easing investors' access to land was apparently made *a sine qua non* for membership in the NAFSN.⁵⁸ Cooperation Frameworks in all countries promote the enactment of titling programs and

land-mapping exercises. McKeon observes, “Action ranges from demarcating and registering lands to establishing or streamlining procedures for land leases to encourage long-term leases, to strengthening land markets.”⁵⁹ For critics, these changes may facilitate transfers of land to companies and therefore undermine customary tenure and community ownership of land.⁶⁰ As De Schutter observes, “the commodification of property rights” sometimes lead to involuntary land cessions which, in turn, “can be a source of exclusion, and increase insecurity of tenure” of vulnerable populations.⁶¹

NGOs have also denounced the impact of the NAFSN on land ownership, suggesting that the program is responsible for actual or foreseeable land grabs. On the basis of 58 publicly available LOIs (representing 20% of all projects as of August 2014), Jamart, Jorand, and Pascal calculate that the NAFSN’s projects cover at least 1.4 million hectares.⁶² According to Curtis, 1.8 million hectares of land in Nigeria, Malawi, Tanzania and Senegal alone have been allotted to the realization of the New Alliance’s initiatives.⁶³ In particular, the author claims that 106,730 hectares of land have been targeted for large-scale land acquisitions in Senegal under the NAFSN. However, this estimate is exaggerated.⁶⁴

The creation of vast agricultural corridors equipped with production and storage infrastructure that service geographically concentrated clusters of companies has also generated concern.⁶⁵ As of 2014, the Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor was under development in Mozambique (however, other announced corridors under the Pro-Savana Programme are stalled).⁶⁶ In Tanzania, the creation of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor (SAGCOT) is currently underway. The Nigerian government is also discussing the establishment of “staple crop processing zones [...] where investors are ‘guaranteed land acquisition’, benefit from ‘low average wages’ and are given tax holidays.”⁶⁷ According to critics, these NAFSN-sponsored corridors could engender the eviction of local populations from their land.⁶⁸

Fiscal and Administrative Changes

Several observers denounce fiscal policy changes announced under the NAFSN. At least 31 modifications related to financial, administrative, and commercial laws are planned in countries participating in the New Alliance in order to ease private companies’ tax burdens. For instance, Malawi has committed to revising its tax system to incentivize investment in the export sector.⁶⁹ Of particular concern are the special economic zones or agricultural corridors involving custom exemptions, tax holidays, and other arrangements to attract private companies.⁷⁰

Critics consider that these fiscal policies risk encumbering governmental budgets and limiting the capacity for public investment in agriculture in Africa. Jamart et al. argue that these provisions also mostly favour large agribusinesses rather than smallholders who operate outside formal administrative circuits in remote rural areas.⁷¹ The World Bank report *Enabling the Business of Agriculture*, which aims to “analyze legal barriers for the business of agriculture and to quantify transaction costs of dealing with government regulations,”⁷² may further encourage African countries to implement market-friendly policies to demarcate themselves in a race to the bottom with regard to fiscal, social and environmental norms.⁷³

2.3 Impacts on Food Security

An early assessment of the New Alliance warns that agribusiness firms primarily cater to their own interests, which may or may not align with improved food security for African countries. As Murphy and Wise observe, “Corporations are accountable to their shareholders, obliged to make a profit. They are not charities. They are bound by law, but not by the public interest.”⁷⁴ Other authors question the validity of the New Alliance’s conception of food security and nutrition, which they consider restricted in scope. A host of civil society organizations released a joint statement in which they note:

The New Alliance [...] is based on the simplistic assumption that corporate investment in agriculture will increase production and that this will automatically improve food and nutrition security and reduce poverty. This logic completely neglects that food and nutrition security means consistent access to a diverse and nutritious diet, which will not be achieved simply by increasing food production.⁷⁵

Drawing on the work of Scrinis, Patel et al. argue that the NAFSN in Malawi is predicated upon “a logic of ‘nutritionism’ – understood as a set of ideas and practices that seek to end hunger not by directly addressing poverty but by prioritizing the delivery of individual molecular components of food to those lacking them [...]”⁷⁶ As such, some critics consider that the New Alliance errs in focusing primarily on nutritional outcomes rather than a more encompassing notion of food security that includes its economic causes and its cultural dimensions. National Cooperation Frameworks often reduce food security – when they mention it at all – to the minimal amount of nutrients and calories needed daily. For instance, Ghana and Ethiopia do not even refer to measures aimed at improving nutritional outcomes in their documents. Among NAFSN members, only Benin adopts new measures and offers concrete steps to diminish the extent of chronic malnutrition.⁷⁷

2.4 Implications for Women

Even though women represent a significant share of small-scale farmers, they disproportionately suffer from malnutrition. In addition, women generally experience greater difficulties in accessing land, credit, and agricultural training.⁷⁸ In this context, several analysts consider that the NAFSN devotes insufficient attention to gender issues, with no mechanisms to measure its impacts on women. They argue that the New Alliance mainly focuses on export crops that are typically controlled by men, while women tend to be responsible for the cultivation of food crops. For critics, this emphasis is likely to reinforce men’s dominance in the agricultural sector.⁷⁹ According to several NGOs, land deals facilitated by the NAFSN also risk overwhelmingly penalizing women, whose land rights remain especially insecure.

The Cooperation Frameworks barely mention women’s particular predicaments and ways to mitigate them.⁸⁰ According to one study, Benin is the only NAFSN country that has elaborated ambitious and measurable commitments to empower women in agriculture. In contrast, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Mozambique do not touch on gender issues at all in their New Alliance documents. For their part, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Malawi, and Burkina Faso allude to the importance of supporting women in agriculture but do not offer concrete indicators to monitor progress.⁸¹ In brief, several NGOs and experts believe that the New Alliance may potentially have detrimental effects on women due to inadequate consideration of gender issues.

2.5 Improper Consultation With Non-Governmental Stakeholders

NGOs believe that civil society organizations and peasant associations have not been properly included in the design of the New Alliance's general orientation and national Cooperation Frameworks.⁸² These documents have in most cases been written hastily (during the summer of 2012, for approval in September 2012). The G7 supposedly invokes this short timeframe to explain the lack of consultation with civil society.⁸³ While the New Alliance has subsequently demonstrated greater efforts to involve NGOs and peasant associations in response to criticisms, observers maintain that civil society remains underrepresented in NAFSN's national meetings.⁸⁴ Perhaps more importantly, the New Alliance has not consulted with the small-scale producers who are directly affected by its implementation.⁸⁵ As such, critics claim that the NAFSN ignores the knowledge and experience of farmers who have developed alternative agricultural models based on agro-ecological principles.⁸⁶ Individuals who suffer from food insecurity and malnutrition have also not been called upon to participate in the definition of New Alliance priorities.

The composition of the Leadership Council is also contested. Oxfam America was a member of the council from 2012 to 2014 but have left because of the body's limited transparency and accountability.⁸⁷ While the CEOs of 7 agribusiness companies represented the private sector as of September 2013, only two producer organizations, the Eastern Africa Farmers Federation (EAFF) and the Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions (SACAU), had seats on the Leadership Council. The West African Network of Peasant and Agricultural Producers' Organizations (*Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et de Producteurs de l'Afrique de l'Ouest – ROPPA*), which promotes family agriculture, was noticeably absent from the list of members, even though, as McKeon observes, "6 of the 10 New Alliance countries are located in West Africa."⁸⁸ According to NAFSN official documents, ROPPA subsequently became a member of the Leadership Council⁸⁹, but this information does not appear to be accurate.⁹⁰

The AUC and NEPAD Agency publicly acknowledged civil society's concerns around the New Alliance, such as "allegations of its negative effects on the livelihoods of small-scale farmers" and improper consideration of "climate change, gender inclusion and nutrition security." In response, the AUC and the CAADP Non-State Actors Coalition (CNC)⁹¹ organized a "consultative meeting" on 14 October 2016, in Entebbe, Uganda. The resulting declaration enunciated a number of objectives and commitments, including the need to ensure that the private sector "is inclusive of the interests of smallholders along the value chain," in a context where "the smallholders' community constitutes the larger [sic] bloc of investors in African Agriculture." In particular, "investments must also provide opportunities for women, youth and the marginal poor." According to the Declaration, monitoring should put less emphasis on quantitative data and instead track NAFSN's "transformative effects." Finally, the New Alliance "should promote agro-ecological practices and innovations and integrate the environmental dimension in its approach."⁹²

3. THE ROLE OF CANADA IN THE NAFSN

Canada devotes substantial funds to food security and agriculture through the NAFSN in Senegal, Ghana, and Ethiopia, although this support is comprised, for the most part, of already programmed money. As the lead partner for Senegal, Canada has primarily worked with the Senegalese

government to elaborate its Cooperation Framework and manage logistics. While it has been pivotal in launching and coordinating the NAFSN in Senegal, Canada has subsequently played a lesser role in its implementation and functioning. Canada's involvement in selecting and supporting firms participating in the NAFSN in Senegal has also remained peripheral. This section examines Canada's financial contributions and role in spearheading the New Alliance in Senegal.

3.1 Financial Support: Redirecting Existing Funds Towards the NAFSN

In recent years, Canada has directed considerable funds toward agriculture and nutrition as part of its aid package to developing countries. In 2009, Canada promised it would “double its investments in agriculture in developing countries and increase resources for food assistance and nutrition.”⁹³ Principles and objectives to this effect were articulated in a *Food Security Strategy* under the auspices of the then Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), which is now subsumed into Global Affairs Canada (GAC). The Strategy focuses on sustainable agricultural development, food assistance and nutrition, and research and development. Canada's commitment to food security is reflected in its involvement with AFSI. According to Canada's Office of the Prime Minister, “At the [G7] Summit in L'Aquila in 2009, Canada announced new funding of \$600 million for sustainable agricultural development over three years, elevating its total support to \$1.18 billion. In April 2011, Canada became the first [G7] country to fully meet its L'Aquila commitment.”⁹⁴

At the NAFSN's inception in 2012, Canada pledged to donate \$219 million. Specifically, from 2012-2014, Canada planned to dedicate \$169 million to finance “ongoing bilateral food security programming in Ghana and Ethiopia,” to spend \$25 million on the creation of “a new Canadian nutrition initiative with multilateral partners to support innovative nutrition research and technologies,” and to allocate \$25 million in new funding for the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP) Public Sector Window that aims to improve farmers' access to markets.⁹⁵ Based on this information, Canada only allotted \$50 million in additional money for two multi-country initiatives subsumed under the NAFSN.⁹⁶ (Funds for Senegal are discussed below.) Canada does not offer subsidies to private companies that participate in the New Alliance.

The global financial contribution of Canada under the New Alliance may appear modest when compared to wealthier donors such as the United States or the European Union. Canada is the 5th most important donor under the NAFSN in terms of contributions measured in absolute terms.⁹⁷ However, Canada respected, and even exceeded, its original funding intentions planned for 2014. When all NAFSN countries are considered, Canada has the second-highest rate of disbursements against intention (135%).⁹⁸ As of 2014, Canada had contributed \$295.62 million to the New Alliance as a whole, while expected funding for that year amounted to \$219.01 million.

3.2 Canadian Encouragement for Senegal to Join the NAFSN

At each G7 annual summit, the host country traditionally proposes an initiative around which other states rally.⁹⁹ Canada's participation in the New Alliance was thus expected. When the NAFSN considered Senegal a potential member in 2013,¹⁰⁰ Canada volunteered to act as its lead partner, since most G7 countries were already designated to assist other African countries. A Canadian official explained that Canada was regarded as an apt choice for this role considering that there are practically no Canadian companies involved in agribusiness in Senegal.¹⁰¹ In his view, Canada was thus seen as “neutral” in the implementation of the NAFSN.

Canadian staff in Dakar then suggested the idea of joining the New Alliance to the Senegalese Prime Minister. (For a timeline of NAFSN activities in Senegal, consult Appendix 5). They presented the NAFSN as a means to secure, and eventually increase, the level of funding that Canada offers Senegal.¹⁰² Canada approached Senegal due to reasons partly related to the former’s domestic political climate. Canadian public administrators seized the opportunity provided by the New Alliance in hopes of maintaining and expanding their activities in Senegal in a context where a changing governmental perspective on development possibly compromised aid programs. Indeed, approval of projects and budget disbursements had become subject to stricter conditions than in the past. The NAFSN represented an occasion for aid staff to advocate for funding in a context where the then Conservative Canadian government tended to believe that private enterprises outperform the public sector and that international aid should prop up commerce and investment.

The G7 contemplated Senegal’s membership in the NAFSN at a moment where Canada was reworking its aid strategy in Senegal and considering collaborating directly with the Senegalese government. Traditionally, Canada has supported organizations of producers in rural areas, but it wanted to effect policy changes at a higher level in order to remedy perceived structural impediments to the conduct of its agricultural programs.¹⁰³ Several analysts believe that the structure of the Senegalese Ministry of Agriculture needs to be revamped to optimize efficiency. In the past, frequent rearrangements of the Minister of Agriculture have also hampered a smooth conduct of affairs. In that context, the NAFSN helped reassure political staff in Ottawa that Senegal was dedicated to making efforts to improve governance through strategic coordination and policy adjustments. Of special importance for Canadian officials was the implementation of a land reform authorizing individual titling and land sales. In their view, the current formal system, which does not confer property rights and limits land allocations to residents of the commune, acts as a hindrance to the development of modern farms.

Canada’s Financial Support to the NAFSN in Senegal

In parallel to its overall commitment to the New Alliance, the Canadian government also pledged money to Senegal, where it had already identified food security as a development assistance priority. It is also the second largest donor to the NAFSN. Canada committed to dedicate \$20 million annually for four years specifically for the NAFSN in Senegal, amounting to \$80 million from 1 April 2013 to 31 March 2017, subject to funding availability for the last three years. Canada’s financial pledge to the NAFSN in all countries amounts to \$299 million. While appreciable, the funds that Canada provides under the NAFSN represent a quarter of the money it committed under L’Aquila.¹⁰⁴

Table 1. Canada’s Pledges under the NAFSN

Initiative	Amount (million \$)
Food security programs in Ghana and Ethiopia	169
Canadian nutrition initiative	25
GAFSP Public Sector Window	25
Agricultural programs, budgetary support, and logistical assistance in Senegal	80
Total	299

According to Canadian officials, Canada already allocated a comparable amount of money to agriculture and food security projects before the beginning of the New Alliance in Senegal.

Canada's logic was that it would record all expenses incurred in the agricultural sector after November 2013 as part of its contributions under the NAFSN.¹⁰⁵ In all likelihood, the NAFSN has therefore not led to an increase in Canada's budget for Senegal.¹⁰⁶ This makes sense, as its goal is to encourage private sector investment, not public sector contributions. However, the NAFSN has helped secure funding for ongoing agricultural projects that might have been otherwise jeopardized, insofar as all programs must be confirmed annually. As the G7 leader for the NAFSN in Senegal, it would have been hardly conceivable for Canada to disengage from agriculture.¹⁰⁷

Most projects pertaining to agricultural development and food security subsumed under the New Alliance were launched prior to that initiative. For the most part, they started between 2009 and 2012, presumably in the wake of AFSI. In Senegal, Canada carries out 5 main programs that count toward its NAFSN funding commitments: Programme for Land Use and Economic Development of the Niayes Region (PADEN), Economic Development of Casamance Programme (PADEC), Support to Rice Production Project for Food Security in Senegal (Bey Dunde), Integrated Support to Food Security and Nutrition (ISFSN), and Integrated Nutrition Project for the Kolda and Kedougou Regions (PINKK). (For information on these programs' goals, duration, sponsors, and funds, see Appendix 4). Combined together, these programs have a total budget of \$89.8 million over several years. Canada's basic aid orientations in Senegal did not change significantly after the New Alliance was initiated. Except for the PINKK program, an initiative pertaining to nutrition, Canada has not approved any major new agricultural projects since the adoption of the New Alliance. It is unclear whether the NAFSN has facilitated the birth of PINKK in Senegal, given that Canada also finances the Micronutrient Initiative (MI), a multi-country project contributing to the Muskoka Initiative's "commitment to Maternal, Newborn and Child Health."

After the NAFSN was launched, the Senegalese government adopted another master plan in February 2014, the Plan for an Emerging Senegal (*Plan Sénégal Émergent* – PSE), which is now the main policy framework for eight sectors deemed fundamental for economic growth. Canada is supposed to donate \$51.5 million for the realization of the PSE over 2016-2020.¹⁰⁸ Part of these funds will count toward the \$80 million pledge to the NAFSN. The disbursement of Canadian aid is conditional on Senegal fulfilling a number of commitments delineated in the Cooperation Framework. Canada has used the New Alliance to focus the content of its conditions on agriculture and food security (in addition to the management of public finances and extractive resources).¹⁰⁹ To obtain the fixed tranche of the general budget support, which amounts to \$5 million each year, Senegal must comply with 5 requirements, including the conduct of an Annual Joint Review of the Agricultural Sector.¹¹⁰ If Senegal fails to meet all the requirements, it risks losing both the fixed and variable portion of the budget support from Canada.

In 2016, disbursement of variable tranches¹¹¹ depended on the achievement of 11 conditions, 5 of which are related to improvements in the business environment and food security: draft of the land reform bill; adoption of a Strategy for the Reconstitution of Seed Stock (*Stratégie de Reconstitution du Capital Semencier*); release of a decree for the exoneration of agricultural material; elaboration and endorsement of the National Strategy of Food Security and Resilience (*Stratégie nationale de sécurité alimentaire et de résilience* – SNSAR);¹¹² and writing of the Sectorial Policy on Nutrition. Requirements for variable tranches are adjusted annually to reflect progress. Of the 11 conditions¹¹³ posed by Canada in 2016, Senegal failed to achieve only one – submission of the land reform bill to

the National Assembly. The NAFSN policy commitments that Canada used as conditions for the allocation of its support will be discussed in greater depth in Section 5.

In addition to agricultural programs and budget support, Canada has also financed NAFSN-related events. Canada extended funds for the organization of workshops to elaborate the Cooperation Framework, the official NAFSN launching ceremony, discussion meetings for the First Progress Report, and revision of the Cooperation Framework. Canada also hired two consultants to survey international aid donors and civil society organizations in order to support the Department of Analysis, Forward Planning and Statistics (*Direction de l'Analyse, de la Prévision et des Statistiques Agricoles – DAPSA*) in writing the First Progress Report.¹¹⁴ Finally, Canada paid a consultant to elaborate and measure CSO commitments for the revised Cooperation Framework and the Second Progress Report.

As of March 2014, the Canadian government had distributed \$11.88 million to Senegal for the NAFSN.¹¹⁵ Between April 1, 2014, and March 30, 2015, Canada expended \$22.62 million for its projects under the New Alliance in Senegal.¹¹⁶ The calculation method for disbursements in 2016 differs from past years, rendering a comparison difficult.¹¹⁷

Logistical Support: Canada Helps to Accelerate the Implementation Process in Senegal

According to a Canadian official, Canada collaborated with the United Kingdom, which was then co-convenor of the Leadership Council, to bring changes to the New Alliance before its implementation in Senegal. On the basis of past experience, both countries agreed that Cooperation Frameworks needed to address women's empowerment and nutrition issues more thoroughly. Canada also insisted on a more effective inclusion of NGOs in the NAFSN.

While Canada encouraged Senegal to join the New Alliance, it is not directly in charge of piloting it. This responsibility falls on the NAIP Political and Technical Committees,¹¹⁸ which are tasked with coordinating NAFSN-related activities. (Consult Appendix 6 for an organizational chart of the NAFSN in Senegal). As facilitators, Canadian Embassy staff have assisted the Senegalese government in drafting the Cooperation Framework. Even though it has coached Senegal in the identification of policy objectives pursued under this initiative and used the occasion to exchange views with the Senegalese government on issues it deemed necessary to address, Canada argues that it has not imposed its choices on Senegal.¹¹⁹ A senior Senegalese official involved in drafting the Cooperation Framework also considers that the exercise was carried out in a collaborative fashion.

The Senegalese Ministry of Agriculture also organized consultation sessions and validation meetings with technical support from the Canadian Embassy. Merely six months elapsed between Senegal's decision to join NAFSN and the program's official inauguration.¹²⁰ In this regard, Canadian staff seem to have catalyzed stakeholders to get things organized. By all accounts, Canada's strong involvement has considerably accelerated the implementation process, an observation confirmed by a Senegalese government agent: "Canada had a very important, proactive role – much more proactive than ours, because we have a thousand things to do. It's true, BACDI [Canadian Cooperation Support Office/*Bureau d'appui à la coopération canadienne*] really worked hard on the NAFSN. The first steps, it's them."¹²¹




Figure 1. Timeline of NAFSN activities in Senegal

While Canada has provided assistance to the Senegalese government, it was not actively involved in the selection of companies participating in the NAFSN. USAID in Washington mandated and funded Monitor Deloitte to identify private investors for Senegal in collaboration with the National Agency for the Promotion of Investment and Infrastructure Works (*Agence Nationale Chargée de la Promotion de l'Investissement et des Grands Travaux – APIX*), the Senegalese governmental agency in charge of helping companies to navigate administrative procedures. Monitor Deloitte approached companies already collaborating with USAID or the US Embassy through their programs.¹²² Initially, the firm was supposed to conduct this work in preparation for then President Obama’s visit to Senegal from June 26-28, 2013. The NAFSN reportedly built on the pool of investors selected to meet with the US President.¹²³ The consulting firm also contacted the economic department of various embassies, including Canada. However, Canada did not provide suggestions on potential private partners.¹²⁴ Monitor Deloitte also solicited two employer organizations, the National Council of Employers (*Conseil National du Patronat – CNP*) and the National Confederation of Employers of Senegal (*Confédération Nationale des Employeurs du Sénégal – CNES*), in order to identify eventual collaborators under the New Alliance. Finally, APIX referred some companies with which it had worked previously.

The New Alliance recruited firms informally, as no public call for expression of interest was organized. There is little evidence that the NAFSN employed defined guidelines to select or exclude firms. The rationale was that the more private partners that join the New Alliance, the better. Companies were simply requested to provide a letter of intent based on a template, in which they

confirmed that their business plan aligned with CAADP's objectives in Senegal. They were invited to describe the content, amount, duration and location of their investments, as well as the number of smallholders they hoped to reach. Companies were not requested to demonstrate how their activities were expected to improve nutrition and food security – not all of them even specified the number of smallholders concerned. As such, a broadly understood intention to invest private funds in agriculture seemed to be the sole criterion required to participate in the New Alliance.¹²⁵

Although Canada is still officially the G7 leader of the New Alliance in Senegal, its responsibilities have been gradually curtailed. Even before the launch of the NAFSN, in June 2013, France took over the G8 partnership for land transparency and governance in Senegal.¹²⁶ In 2015, the African Union designated France to survey the TFPs, Grow Africa to canvass private companies, and the Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (SAKKS) to evaluate the government. Africa Lead compiled the information and coordinated the writing of the Second Progress Report. Senegalese and Canadian staff in charge of monitoring the New Alliance in Senegal did not entirely understand the motivation behind this decision, which in their view seemed imposed from above. Also, the Office of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Agriculture of Senegal are now engaging directly with the African Union on matters related to the NAFSN.¹²⁷ Canada is not included in these exchanges. It may be an encouraging sign that the African Union is taking the reins on the New Alliance, but as a result, Canadian staff members feel less engaged and accountable. Finally, the election of a Liberal government in Canada in November 2015 seems to signal a change in aid development priorities away from the NAFSN.¹²⁸

4. EXPECTATIONS AND COMMITMENTS UNDER THE NAFSN IN SENEGAL

In Senegal, the NAFSN aims “to attract and mobilize national and international private investment to stimulate and support [the] sustainable development of the agricultural sector.”¹²⁹ According to the Cooperation Framework, “Food security and nutrition means improving access to sufficient quality food everywhere and at all times, as well as reducing poverty and eradicating hunger by meeting the commitments regarding gender equality, the environment, and access to productive resources for smallholders, particularly women.”¹³⁰ The NAFSN in Senegal aims to contribute to governmental efforts to diminish the poverty rate from 46.7% in 2013 to 39.48% in 2016.¹³¹

Prior to the NAFSN's launch, Monitor Deloitte was asked to survey the business community and suggest measures to improve the institutional environment in Senegal. Its study concludes that five main factors constrain agricultural investment in that country: unclear administrative procedures and non-involvement of stakeholders in fiscal reforms; difficulties in obtaining funding and agricultural insurance; complexities in gaining access to land; high electricity costs as well as inadequate transportation and irrigation infrastructure; and poorly structured commercial value chains, including limited access to inputs.¹³² Monitor Deloitte recommended a series of measures, such as the creation of institutional channels to involve private partners in the conduct of governmental reforms; the development of agricultural insurance and lease-purchase agreements; increased collaboration with banks; public-private partnerships to improve roads and irrigation installations; implementation of contracts to ease investors' access to land; and encouragement of contract farming and technical training for smallholders. The two versions of the Cooperation Framework have taken some of these recommendations into consideration.

Many civil society representatives in Senegal recognize that contractual arrangements between producers and industries may constitute an interesting compromise. They suggest directing private investment in food processing activities that require a high level of capital and technical capacity. A division of labour between family farms in charge of production and companies responsible for food processing could also help ease pressures on land.¹³³ However, many CSOs, including in Senegal, hold that the NAFSN promotes a narrow definition of private investment that primarily centers on agribusiness. They argue that small-scale producers themselves remain the biggest investors in agriculture when considered collectively, and should be enabled to increase investment in their farms. Yet this type of investment remains largely invisible in the New Alliance discourse, which prioritizes private industry in the policies it promotes. According to Senegalese CSOs, in order to boost family agriculture, support is needed to provide professional training to smallholders, install agricultural infrastructure, and manage climate risks.¹³⁴ Peasant organizations also request facilitated access to credit, agricultural equipment, and inputs.

4.1 High Expectations for the NAFSN

The NAFSN has generated many expectations in Senegal. Several companies that decided to participate in the New Alliance regarded it as a platform to inform the government about their grievances, as one private partner explains: “We consider the NAFSN as a rallying point between us and the state. One of the factors that prompted us to join is the possibility to share on the handicaps we experience as a company.”¹³⁵ Many CEOs expected swift policy changes in response to the needs they expressed. Others thought they would receive ad hoc governmental answers to their operational difficulties. For instance, a few entrepreneurs believed that participating in the NAFSN would ease their access to land. Some also hoped to obtain technical training or assistance to help achieve commitments indicated in their LOIs.

A few companies, as well as certain Senegalese officials, understood that the NAFSN would offer financial support to the private sector. Others were hoping to access inside information on possible partnerships with the Senegalese government, aid donors or foreign companies – this was suggested in the LOI template itself. Others regarded the New Alliance as an opportunity to showcase their activities, increase their visibility and participate in public events. In sum, the content of their expectations and level of understanding of the objectives of the New Alliance varies considerably between the private partners that were interviewed. However, all were hopeful that the NAFSN could play a positive role in improving the business environment.

The Senegalese government was already contemplating various means to increase private investment in agriculture before the New Alliance. The prime minister at the time was Abdoul Mbaye, a former banker with strong inclinations toward supporting the private sector.¹³⁶ While Senegal did not initiate the process to join the NAFSN, the Prime Minister and his staff regarded it as a timely opportunity to rearrange the fiscal architecture in a more favourable manner for agribusiness companies, both national and international. In the opinion of Senegalese senior advisors, the New Alliance offered them institutional support in drawing from the experiences of other countries to reform the business environment in Senegal and assemble these measures into a Cooperation Framework. They also welcomed the opportunity to engage with the private sector in

the context of NAFSN meetings. In sum, they did not view the New Alliance as being exogenously imposed on them.

One Senegalese government official compared the New Alliance to a “banquet” allowing Senegal to network with actors belonging to a global coalition of superpowers. In his opinion, Senegal could not miss this opportunity given that several other African countries had already joined. Having a G7 leader partnering in the process with them conferred credibility to Senegal, and represented a guarantee for private investors. The Senegalese government did not seem to expect new funding for its own agricultural programs, however. Also, APIX viewed the NAFSN as a means to encourage companies that underestimated their potential to increase their investment levels, but not necessarily as an instrument to attract new investors.

4.2 Stakeholder Commitments Under the NAFSN

The Senegalese government, private companies, and international aid donors each made a set of commitments under the NAFSN. In addition, these parties agreed on some shared commitments. Civil society organizations do not figure in the first Cooperation Framework, but were added in the second version of the document. Stakeholders are expected to report on their progress annually, but all commitments are voluntary, including the LOIs signed by private companies.

Commitments by the Government of Senegal

The Government of Senegal initially identified three general objectives to fulfill NAFSN ambitions: 1) “Create an incentive-based business environment in order to increase private investment in the agricultural sector (agriculture, livestock, fisheries, forestry) and in nutrition”; 2) “Improve supply chain productivity and competitiveness to ensure food security”; and 3) “Reduce the prevalence of stunting and wasting in children under the age of 5.”¹³⁷

To this effect, the Senegalese government pledged to implement a total of 17 policy measures. To achieve the first objective mentioned above, the government promised to diminish subsidies allocated to agricultural inputs from 0.5% to 0.3% of the gross domestic product (GDP) over three years and to better target recipients; to increase the volume of “financial loans” devoted to agriculture from 3% to 8% by 2015; to “define and implement land reform measures for responsible agriculture”; and to apply tax exemptions for the purchase of agricultural equipment. The government further identified eight policy actions to structure agricultural value chains, including for instance the development of infrastructure to improve market access and storage capacities; the reconstitution of seed stock with the involvement of the private sector; implementation of the National Livestock Development Plan; application of the Sectorial Policy Brief on Fisheries and Aquaculture; and pursuit of the Program to Combat Deforestation and Soil Degradation. To diminish the prevalence of stunting and emaciation of children under the age of five, the Senegalese state committed to update and/or implement its nutrition policy, its policy on infant and young child feeding, the Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes,¹³⁸ and the Codex Alimentarius.¹³⁹

The Senegalese government has also elaborated goals that are not listed in the 17 policy measures but appear in the first Cooperation Framework. Notably, it intends to encourage contract-based production in agriculture, facilitate lease-purchase agreements of agricultural equipment, and

promote agricultural insurance. Additionally, the government aims to foster private investment in the agricultural sector by “focusing on participation by all stakeholders in the development of policies.” Finally, the state has reiterated its desire to expand women’s economic opportunities in the agricultural sector, notably through better access and control over factors of production, services, and markets, as well as the provision of technical and managerial training.¹⁴⁰

With the adoption of the second Cooperation Framework in 2014, the Senegalese state specified and broke down the content of the 17 initial commitments into 50 measurable components. A majority – 25 – of these new policy objectives concern the business environment, while only 8 are related to nutrition. In the second progress report, the government delineated 5 major monitoring rubrics: improvement of the business environment, land and natural resources policies and rights, nutrition, political institutions, and input policies.¹⁴¹

Commitments by Private Companies

Businesses that have submitted letters of intent pledged to put in place “internal consultation frameworks” in order to adopt and pursue NAFSN’s objectives, “especially linking producers’ groups, improving food and nutrition security, promoting responsible investment and mobilizing funds.”¹⁴² Another commitment was subsequently added in the first progress report released in 2014, according to which the private sector pledged “to cooperate effectively with the government to establish and strengthen businesses and initiatives that will have a major impact on reducing poverty across the country and boosting economic growth.”¹⁴³ The revised Cooperation Framework also includes new objectives for companies and lays out the private sector’s commitment to creating working groups to structure different agricultural value chains, similar to the existing inter-professional frameworks for rice and tomatoes. Private partners also pledge to take into consideration women’s strategic interests and practical needs in their investments. Future letters of intent will have to specify concrete means to encourage women’s empowerment.

Beyond these common commitments, private partners have enumerated their own targets in individual letters of intent. Companies involved in the New Alliance differ significantly in terms of objectives and planned investments (See Appendix 7 for a list of business sectors and financial commitments). As indicated above, the NAFSN accepted all companies that showed an interest in joining the program, without much oversight. As a result, it comprises a heterogeneous mix of companies, ranging from Senegalese companies with a social mandate, to privatized state agencies plagued by financial difficulties, and multinationals oriented toward export markets.¹⁴⁴

NAFSN companies are active in a variety of areas: inputs, production, transformation, and technical and financial services. Several companies are involved in food processing activities.¹⁴⁵ Insofar as these enterprises rely on small-scale farmers to source raw materials, they do not necessarily enter into competition with them, although they can sometimes offer low purchase prices. At least six enterprises involved in fisheries as well as fruit and vegetable farming export some or all of their production. However, agricultural products that do not satisfy export standards are usually sold on local markets. Other activities indicated in the Cooperation Framework include technical training, organizational support, and insurance products for farmers. In addition, six private partners aim to create jobs for women, source agricultural products from them, increase their revenues, or collaborate with groups of women. The monetary value of these commitments is not quantified.

If all the LOIs made to date under the NAFSN are considered (including companies that have left the initiative), private partners have pledged \$770.65 million in Senegal. Based on available information, food processing is the most important sphere of activities under the NAFSN in terms of financial commitments (approximately \$245.65 million), followed by production (at least \$139.25 million), inputs (around \$112.6 million), and training and services (about \$12.65 million). All the companies involved in the New Alliance were operating in Senegal before it was instigated and, for the most part, had already programmed their investment projects. It seems, however, that some companies have diversified their portfolios to align with food security imperatives. For instance, one firm that already exported fruits and vegetables considered producing traditional cereals for the local market. Some other private partners have perhaps inflated the ambit of their projects in hopes of receiving funding from the NAFSN or the Senegalese government.

Commitments by Technical and Financial Partners

Under the NAFSN, technical and financial partners (TFPs) reiterated their prior engagement “(i) to align assistance to the agricultural sector with the programs and priorities identified by Senegal in the NAIP, and to increase their contributions toward financing the programs identified; (ii) to indicate future assistance to the agricultural sector on a multi-year basis in order to allow better predictability, planning, budgeting and implementation.”¹⁴⁶ The revised Cooperation Framework includes a third commitment to help Senegal in its efforts to promote women’s economic autonomy and gender equality in the execution of the NAIP and New Alliance.¹⁴⁷

Funds that other donors have promised for the NAFSN in Senegal seem to have been programmed before the project was launched.¹⁴⁸ The United States did not reserve specific monies for the New Alliance either; the funds outlined in the Cooperation Framework are linked to two existing initiatives: Feed the Future and the Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact. Each country sets its own objectives and runs its agricultural programs independently, although TFPs have principally agreed to match their interventions with the priorities identified in the NAIP.¹⁴⁹ In total, G7 countries and development partners have promised \$1.05 billion to finance activities comprised under the New Alliance in Senegal. This makes Senegal the second largest recipient of funds under the NAFSN after Ethiopia, which has been promised \$1.31 billion.

Commitments by Civil Society Organisations

Commitments by civil society organizations are a new addition to the second Cooperation Framework, and one that seems unique to Senegal.¹⁵⁰ The document explicitly recognizes that CSOs are stakeholders in the New Alliance. In that capacity, they agree to play a monitoring and warning role to ensure that NAFSN commitments are respected, in particular those related to land issues, access to financial resources, professional training, the emergence of the cooperative movement, women’s empowerment, management of seed production, and the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security.¹⁵¹ To this effect, CSOs commit to attending NAFSN meetings, disseminate information on the initiative, and contribute actively to solving the land question.

Shared Commitments

Shared commitments by the Senegalese government, private investors, and TFPs include the preservation of “the natural foundations of agricultural, forestry, livestock, and fishery

production”, as well as the consideration of the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security.¹⁵² NAFSN’s stakeholders have also vowed to achieve objectives related to the International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes, the World Health Assembly’s resolutions on Infant and Young Child Nutrition, and the Regional Nutritional Strategy developed by the African Union.

5. ASSESSMENT OF NAFSN’S OBJECTIVES IN SENEGAL

Proponents of the New Alliance argue that the initiative invites African countries to take ownership of the domestic implementation of the plan, while critics maintain that, on the contrary, it imposes unwarranted policy revisions. In Senegal, however, the NAFSN has not brought about major new changes insofar as the Cooperation Framework essentially compiles pre-existing goals and programs.

This section discusses the New Alliance’s principles and objectives on paper in relation to the critiques it has received, and illustrates the ways in which the NAFSN in Senegal is built on a number of relatively weak assumptions and problematic evaluation methods. Despite these shortcomings, the Cooperation Framework contains some governmental measures that may foster agricultural development.

5.1 The NAFSN’s Influence on Domestic Policies and Priorities

Overall, the New Alliance is congruent with Senegal’s priorities and orientations in the agricultural sector, which have sought the greater participation of private partners since the arrival of former President Abdoulaye Wade in 2000.¹⁵³ Senegalese political authorities also think that the goals of the NAFSN mesh with the current governmental approach toward agricultural development.

A lack of institutional continuity is nonetheless observable. While the Senegalese government considers that it has aligned the objectives of the New Alliance with its NAIP, several measures contained in the NAFSN Cooperation Framework do not figure in the NAIP as such, given the explicit focus of the New Alliance on the private sector and the creation of other initiatives with the succession of Wade to current President Macky Sall.¹⁵⁴ In February 2014, the state also launched a new program that specifically guides its intervention in the agricultural sector: the Program to Accelerate the Pace of Agriculture in Senegal (*Programme de Relance et d’Accélération de la Cadence de l’Agriculture Sénégalaise* – PRACAS). Thereafter, the Senegalese government shifted its focus from the NAIP to PRACAS, which it now promotes as its chief agricultural program.

The inclusion in the Cooperation Framework of objectives not linked to the NAIP is not necessarily a product of Senegal’s enrolment in the NAFSN. Several measures encouraged by the New Alliance were already in the Senegalese government’s pipeline, an indication that it was able to design its Cooperation Framework in line with existing priorities. For instance, before the NAFSN was implemented, the government had announced that it would exempt agricultural equipment from the value-added tax (VAT) as part of its new Fiscal Code, adopted on December 31, 2012. This measure was included in then President Abdoulaye Wade’s Great Agricultural Offensive for Food and Abundance (*Grande Offensive Agricole pour la Nourriture et l’Abondance* – GOANA), launched in 2008.¹⁵⁵ Similarly, the idea of creating a governmental fund to finance small and medium

enterprises first appeared in 2010.¹⁵⁶ In his electoral platform, President Macky Sall also promised to establish a sovereign strategic fund in order to improve access to agricultural insurance and modernize infrastructure.¹⁵⁷ Projects for the creation of the Priority Investment Guarantee Fund (*Fonds de Garantie pour les Investissements Prioritaires* – FONGIP), the Sovereign Strategic Investment Fund (*Fonds Souverain d'Investissements Stratégiques* – FONSIS) and the National Bank for Economic Development (*Banque Nationale de Développement Économique* – BNDE) were not mentioned in the NAIP, but nonetheless preceded the New Alliance. In addition, the implementation of Credit Reference Bureaus emanates from a West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) initiative unrelated to the New Alliance. Finally, the Program for Reforms of the Business Environment and Competitiveness (*Programme de Réformes de l'Environnement des Affaires et de la Compétitivité* – PREAC), adopted in December 2012, includes several measures that appear in the NAFSN Cooperation Framework.¹⁵⁸

Canada does not seem to have directly influenced the specific content of Senegal's NAFSN Cooperation Framework, although it has recently drawn up conditions to encourage the Senegalese government to respect its commitments. As such, Canada uses pre-existing Senegalese priorities to impose its own requirements for the disbursement of its financial support. In doing so, Canada put emphasis on policy changes it considers the most imperative, which might not necessarily correspond to those of the Senegalese government. Even if senior Senegalese officials do not feel that these conditions represent an undue burden, it is nonetheless Canada that approached Senegal to join the NAFSN to begin with, conferring a somehow circular character to the enforcement of these requirements. Indeed, it would arguably have been delicate for Senegal to refuse to join a G7-sponsored initiative in the first place, as the country's dependence on aid makes it difficult for the government to decline participation in donor projects.

In sum, the Senegalese state does not appear to have adopted new policy goals as a result of its involvement in the NAFSN, as confirmed by high-ranking officials. However, these public servants estimate that, at the time of its inception, the New Alliance has legitimized the government's approach to agricultural development. In addition, discussions to determine policy objectives seem to have centered on the needs of the Senegalese private sector (and not necessarily on those of powerful MNCs). NAFSN's efforts to work with existing African initiatives in a more consistent fashion are laudable. Yet these priorities were not developed in a vacuum; they originate in a normative framework that prevails in the global realm. In Africa, conceptions that circulate in international circles influence political elites' views on agricultural development. For instance, most African countries have elaborated "emergence plans." The concept of emergence does not fundamentally depart from neoliberal tenets; it is rather a new development "avatar" produced by private consulting firms operating in a global economic environment.¹⁵⁹

Food Security Objectives

Achieving food security¹⁶⁰ is a complex issue to which the New Alliance has perhaps not devoted enough consideration. Overall, the Cooperation Framework has not identified the structural causes of food insecurity and malnutrition in Senegal. This oversight makes it difficult to devise appropriate measures that could redress deficiencies. The Cooperation Framework does not spell out the ways in which private funding of agriculture will translate into increased food security and

reduced malnutrition for vulnerable populations.¹⁶¹ The NAFSN has seemingly not helped participating companies to reflect on adequate strategies to support smallholders either.

The assumption behind the NAFSN is that integrating smallholders into value chains is an obvious path to increasing revenues and productivity, and as a result, food security. A considerable body of research shows indeed that inclusive value chains may create employment and raise farmers' incomes,¹⁶² which in turn enhances their ability to command food in markets.¹⁶³ Higher purchasing power can lead to nutritional improvements if people use this extra income to eat more healthily. So farmers do not necessarily need to increase their own agricultural production to improve food security and nutrition.

However, the New Alliance does not seem to give full consideration to the other side of the story. The limitations of global value chains must be addressed lest they create new problems. Smallholders who integrate formal value chains can lose autonomy in productive activities, especially, as Lee, Gereffi, and Beauvais observe, in “bilateral oligopolies [...] characterized by the presence of concentrated producers and retailers with tight chain coordination.”¹⁶⁴ If they are producing for export, smallholders may face volatile world markets and become more vulnerable to broader economic conditions than they otherwise would have been if they were producing for local markets. Vorley also notes that local markets can provide more flexible solutions to “cash strapped farmers” than integration in value chains involving “contracts, membership of a producer groups, delayed payments and strict compliance with standards for quality.” Dynamic informal markets can also offer higher prices than predetermined production contracts.¹⁶⁵

As Seville, Buxton, and Vorley remark, “a producer’s assets are a critical factor in their ability to participate in and benefit from formal markets.” In the course of agricultural modernization, less productive farmers will likely be left out from value chains with no governmental safety nets or alternative employment options. As such, the development of inclusive value chains “requires learning how to reach the less organized farmers and investing with farmers so that those with fewer assets also benefit.”¹⁶⁶ For Vermeulen and Cotula, the inclusiveness of value chains depends ultimately on the balance of ownership between smallholders and agribusiness investors, on local actors’ “ability to influence key business decisions,” on the distribution of risk between business partners, and on “the sharing of economic costs and benefits.”¹⁶⁷

Finally, the NAFSN does not appear to consider the adverse effects that global economic policies can have on domestic private investment. For instance, Economic Partnership Agreements between Europe and Africa to liberalize trade include the elimination of customs duties on European produce. While the European Union contends that it does not subsidize the export of agricultural commodities, Berthelot has contested this claim using econometric models.¹⁶⁸ These agreements are likely to render African agricultural products less competitive.

Changes in Seed Laws

The NAFSN in Senegal has not resulted in the adoption of new seed laws. However, a revised policy document, the Strategy for the Reconstitution of Seed Stock,¹⁶⁹ was issued in 2016. The Strategy was developed to respond to the fact that current seed supplies are insufficient to meet demand, despite more than ten years of governmental efforts to replenish seed reserves.¹⁷⁰ It proposes to

set up an efficient seed system that is adapted to the needs of smallholders by 2020. Specifically, the Strategy aims to increase the quantities of seeds certified by an Official Service of Control, improve the quality control process, enlarge seed storage capacity, and eliminate commercial malpractices. The Strategy also plans to capitalize on the presence of AfricaRice in Senegal, which provides *New Rice for Africa* (Nerica) seeds, a cultivar that crosses African and Asian varieties through plant breeding.¹⁷¹

According to the Senegalese Institute of Agricultural Research (*Institut Sénégalais de Recherche Agricole* – ISRA), peasant seeds are underperforming by 30% in comparison to certified seeds, but this assertion is disputed.¹⁷² Nonetheless, the Strategy does not exclude small-scale farmers altogether. For instance, cooperatives of the Association for the Promotion of Grassroots Development (*Association pour la Promotion du Développement à la Base* – ASPRODEB) are important actors in the multiplication of pre-basic seeds produced by ISRA.¹⁷³ However, to counter a lack of resources, the Senegalese government has recently allowed a few private companies to produce pre-basic seeds, an activity that previously reserved for state agencies.¹⁷⁴ The Strategy does not include measures to promote peasant seeds, although it does not impose restrictions on them either.

In 2010, Senegal started the application process to become a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) seed certification scheme.¹⁷⁵ Reference to the scheme disappeared in the second Progress Report. However, Senegal was accepted as a member on May 21, 2015.¹⁷⁶ As a result, Senegal's seed control and certification system is now internationally recognized. Senegal will be able to export maize, rice, and sorghum seeds to other member countries. Proponents of the OECD scheme say that it will help Senegal produce higher quality seeds.¹⁷⁷ The relevance of this policy remains unclear, as Senegal experiences difficulties in providing enough seeds for its domestic market.

Critics have also argued that the NAFSN aims to facilitate the introduction of GMOs to Africa. There have allegedly been discussions about the promotion of GMOs in the context of the New Alliance in Senegal, but the idea was not pushed at higher decision-making levels.¹⁷⁸ Senegalese officials considered the issue too political to include it in the Cooperation Framework.¹⁷⁹ Also, the Strategy for the Reconstitution of the Seed Stock does not amend the existing Law n° 2009-27 on biosecurity, which restricts the use and trade of GMOs in Senegal.¹⁸⁰

Land Reform

In 2012, Senegal initiated a process to revise the 1964 National Domain Law, which confers to rural councils the authority to allocate land. The content of this policy change was inspired by the Sustainable and Inclusive Agribusiness Development Project (*Projet de Développement Inclusif et Durable de l'Agrobusiness au Sénégal* – PDIDAS), financed by the World Bank. Despite comprehensive consultations with numerous stakeholders, the President of the National Land Reform Commission (*Commission Nationale de Réforme Foncière* – CNRF) seemed to already have a preference: matriculation of all lands in the name of the state → emphyteutic¹⁸¹ lease from the state to municipal councils → creation of subleases for individual users, both locals and foreigners. In a public speech, President Macky Sall also excluded the possibility of registering land in the name of municipalities.¹⁸² The CNRF shared a draft of the policy document with government agencies, the

private sector and civil society in August 2016.¹⁸³ Concerned that the proposed leases might compromise customary land rights instead of protect them, civil society organizations issued a statement deploring the emphasis on the recognition of “indefeasible rights to the exclusion of all other systems of land securement.”¹⁸⁴

It seems that these complaints were partially heard. While affirming the need to allow private investors to access land, the final land policy document¹⁸⁵ issued in October 2016 states that “the fundamental orientation of the law on the national domain in favor of local land administration is maintained.” The text also calls for the creation of “a graduation of land rights which may be of a different legal nature” (administrative certificate, certificate of possession, lease or sublease, land title, etc.), “with gateways to move from one type of title to another.”¹⁸⁶

One of the objectives listed in the Cooperation Framework concerns the finalization of the current “land reform in a participatory manner to enable the issuance of titles” to enterprises.¹⁸⁷ However, Senegal’s proposed reform predates its accession to the NAFSN and likely would have been undertaken regardless of whether or not Senegal joined the New Alliance. In the last 20 years, the government started a land reform review process on three occasions but interrupted it each time.¹⁸⁸ Despite pressure from international bodies and domestic farmer organizations, it has consistently postponed implementing each land reform due to fears that such changes would destabilize the rural world. In this context, the New Alliance represents an additional incentive to complete the transformation of the land tenure system but was not the main impetus.

Initially, Canada made the adoption of a land reform policy a condition for disbursing its budgetary support to Senegal. After discussion with the Senegalese government, Canadian officials realized that the National Assembly could actually reject the proposed reform. Instead, Canada is now asking the Senegalese state to submit the draft bill to the National Assembly as a condition for the release of funds. Canadian agents claim that they have not invited members of the Commission to favour one particular option or the other in the draft bill, although Canada undeniably regards land titling as a high priority for stimulating private investments in agriculture.

Other Commitments in the Cooperation Framework

At least on paper, the NAFSN Cooperation Framework contains a number of good measures put forth by the Senegalese government (though with some caveats). For instance, one sub-objective aims to develop a professional training program for the agricultural sector. This is a laudable goal, although funds were not yet available when the review was conducted for the 2015 progress report.¹⁸⁹ One indicator also mentions the receipt of 106 storage warehouses. This project is not a governmental commitment per se, as it has been financed by WAEMU, but nonetheless represents a relevant initiative in a context where post-harvest losses amount to 30-40% of agricultural production in Senegal.

Senegal is also the only country among the ten African members of the NAFSN that refers to environmental considerations in its Cooperation Framework.¹⁹⁰ One policy commitment reads that the government must “Continue to implement the program to combat deforestation and soil degradation through sustainable and integrated management of forest stands and soil.” In this regard, the National Strategic Investment Framework for Sustainable Land Management (*Cadre*

national d'investissement stratégique en gestion durable des terres) aims to combat soil salinization. Another indicator refers to the dissemination of improved technologies by ISRA, to help small-scale producers cope with climate change – although it also seems to correspond to the West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program (WAAPP) financed by the World Bank.¹⁹¹ However, the Cooperation Framework does not address the links between climate change, rainfall deficits, and food shortages in a thorough manner. Also, the document does not contain any measures to support organic agriculture or agro-ecological practices.

One good proposal involves the adoption of a new Pastoral Code by the National Assembly. Elaboration of the pastoral code started in 2013 with the participation of dedicated experts. It aims to protect access to grazing areas; regulate seasonal cattle migration and straying; and diminish conflicts between pastoralists and agricultural producers. The construction of four centers for collecting milk is another commendable initiative.¹⁹² The implementation of the Sustainable Fisheries Management Project (*Projet d'aménagement durable des pêcheries du Sénégal – ADUPES*), which began in 2014, may help limit overfishing. The European Union finances this program.

Most Senegalese experts and NGO representatives agree with the Cooperation Framework's goal of reducing agricultural subsidies, because they are often captured by political elites or religious leaders and seldom reach small producers.¹⁹³ Also, subsidized inputs are typically delivered after the cultivation season has started, disrupting the cropping calendar. According to many, the most impoverished farmers still need subsidized seeds and fertilizers, but the majority of producers would benefit more from better access to credit.

5.2 Inclusiveness and Sense of Ownership of the NAFSN

Senegal's accession to the New Alliance stems from a decision made at the highest political levels. There were no public consultations to assess the relevance of joining this initiative for Senegal's development. However, after President Macky Sall confirmed Senegal's membership in the NAFSN, several discussion sessions were organized to elaborate the Cooperation Framework and to monitor progress. Opinions on the inclusiveness of the meetings vary.

Senegal and Canada depict the implementation process as being participatory and transparent, a view shared by some stakeholders, notably some Senegalese agencies. For instance, the Task Force against Malnutrition (*Cellule de Lutte contre la Malnutrition – CLM*) considers that the NAFSN took its point of view seriously and that the workshops represented a unique occasion to dialogue with other institutional partners and private firms.¹⁹⁴ Based on information available in Progress Reports, Senegalese agencies in charge of nutrition issues do not, however, seem to have taken part in subsequent consultation workshops. Now that it is functional again, the Executive Secretariat of the National Food Security Council (*Secrétariat exécutif du Conseil national de la sécurité alimentaire – SE-CNSA*) regrets that it is not more involved in overseeing the activities of the New Alliance, given its focus on food security.¹⁹⁵

Several professional agricultural organizations and civil society groups feel that their participation in the early consultation process primarily served cosmetic purposes. For instance, they would have liked to be included in the selection of companies taking part in the New Alliance.¹⁹⁶ However, CSOs were surveyed during the two review processes. The NAFSN reported the point of view of different

stakeholders in its institutional documents in a relatively transparent manner. For instance, concerns that NGOs have expressed seem to have been duly recorded in the first documents of the NAFSN (although certain groups consider that their critiques have been diluted or misrepresented).

Despite these discussions, NGO priorities not already included in the Cooperation Framework were not translated into new policy objectives. Peasant organizations have consistently advocated for the promotion of family agriculture, and several consider that agribusiness companies compete unfairly with smallholders. These concerns have not been effectively integrated into the functioning of the New Alliance. However, CSOs have requested and obtained from the New Alliance the informal recognition that family producers also represent valuable private investors in agriculture. Indeed, after having criticized the NAFSN, ASPRODEB joined the initiative as a private partner, a significant achievement that illustrates the relative openness of Senegal and Canada, but also the strength of Senegalese civil society (even though ASPRODEB has not subsequently publicized its decision to participate in the NAFSN).¹⁹⁷

Many of the civil society representatives interviewed in this research were not very familiar with the specific content of the Cooperation Framework in Senegal. This reveals both a lack of public education efforts on the part of the New Alliance, as well as NGOs' limited interest in this initiative in a context where other matters, notably the land reform, were deemed more urgent. In comparison with other issues, some NGOs have admittedly not been as well organized and mobilized on the NAFSN. Other CSOs have been more proactive. While recognizing that the founding principles of the New Alliance remain problematic, they have enunciated counter arguments and attempted to modify the content and objectives of the NAFSN from within.

According to the Canadian team, the Senegalese government has occasionally convened the private sector to meetings and workshops in past years but has not necessarily consulted with them systematically. One of the objectives of the New Alliance is to facilitate dialogue between the government and the business community for a better consideration of the latter's concerns. Canada and Senegal's officials estimate that this goal has been attained. However, the current Senegalese Prime Minister seems less prone to advance the NAFSN agenda. As a result, several firms taking part in the New Alliance maintain their own independent lobbying channels to influence the government on issues that directly affect them.

Many company representatives involved in the NAFSN in Senegal oscillate between incomprehension and disappointment, a situation that echoes that of Burkina Faso and Ghana.¹⁹⁸ Several private partners do not fully understand the basic principles of the New Alliance. Some companies feel that the number of direct meetings they have had with the Senegalese government is insufficient and would like more interaction. In contrast, others are experiencing "meeting fatigue." A CEO shared his discontent: "I am a little disappointed with the NAFSN because there are a lot of discourses, a lot of declarations. But economic operators on the ground are still waiting for results."¹⁹⁹ They complain that they have not seen concrete outcomes and appropriate follow-up actions after the completion of questionnaires and the organization of these sessions. Companies also feel that the language of the NAFSN is rather abstract and does not allow them to clearly understand the policy reforms that are being undertaken.

Finally, direct consultations with those who are affected (both positively and negatively) by the NAFSN in rural and urban areas are remarkably absent from the New Alliance elaboration and implementation process, a pattern observed in other member countries as well. None of the agricultural producers interviewed for this study had ever heard of the NAFSN.

In brief, the NAFSN in Senegal has, so far, been characterized by an overall lack of coherence, ownership, and communication. Several individuals from the government, civil society, and private sector wish they were better informed about the New Alliance and could participate more actively in monitoring and implementation activities. When these problems and misunderstandings were brought up with Canadian officials in Dakar, their importance was downplayed. In the opinion of the Canadian staff, their role is to communicate information, but they are not responsible for making sure that stakeholders grasp the principles and goals of the NAFSN. However, Canadian agents do recognize that civil society organizations must be able to influence the content of governmental objectives included in the New Alliance.

5.3 Self-Referential Evaluation Method

One of the major difficulties in assessing the results of the New Alliance relates to its internal evaluation method. There are no mechanisms to determine how the NAFSN effectively contributes to reducing poverty or improving food security and nutrition (the progress reports do not measure these indicators).²⁰⁰ According to Canadian officials, the objective of lifting 50 million people out of poverty was a simplified message used as a “marketing strategy” to legitimize the New Alliance. As such, it remains “an aspirational goal”, not an “attributional” one.²⁰¹ This statement lends credence to critics of the NAFSN who wonder whether the initiative can succeed in reducing poverty and food insecurity. Although there may be significant progress on these two objectives before 2022, there is no way to directly correlate it to the NAFSN.

Achievements are principally measured against commitments that each set of stakeholders made in the Cooperation Framework, rendering the assessment exercise rather self-referential. For instance, results obtained by the TFPs involved in the New Alliance are evaluated solely on the basis of planned levels of aid. There is no substantive assessment of the impact of their programs on the development of agriculture and improvement of nutrition within the ambit of the NAFSN.²⁰² As several donor programs began before the NAFSN, it is also unclear as to whether they respect Senegal’s agricultural priorities. Similarly, Senegalese governmental agencies provide to the DAPSA an appraisal of progress on policy indicators for which they are responsible. Not only is Senegal the NAFSN country with the highest number of governmental commitments, it also has the highest rate of completion for 2014 (54%).²⁰³ However, when one looks closely at the results, several achievements seem only vaguely related to the initial commitments.

The main indicators used to monitor the private sector are the global value of realized investments, the number of jobs created, the number of smallholders reached,²⁰⁴ and the implementation status of LOIs.²⁰⁵ Each company is responsible for evaluating and reporting on its own progress; there is no independent auditing to verify information. As such, possible negative impacts of corporate activities related to the NAFSN are not accounted for. Some private enterprises believe that this rating system is inadequate and would like the NAFSN to carry on-the-ground visits to separate the grain from the chaff. Also, because not all private partners have provided their annual progress

reports, there is no reliable baseline to interpret the aggregate data meaningfully from year to year and compare indicators before and after the New Alliance.

Lastly, the New Alliance has impacts in Senegal through a number of “global enabling actions” it endorses. According to NAFSN reports, the SSTP, the New Alliance Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Extension Challenge Fund, and the Platform for Agricultural Risk Management have been conducting activities in Senegal.²⁰⁶ The Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) initiative is also present. However, it is impossible to evaluate the consequences of these programs, as they are not reviewed in Senegal’s progress reports for unknown reasons.²⁰⁷ Most stakeholders, including Canadian officials, were unaware of the existence of these enabling actions.

6. EVALUATION OF NAFSN’S RESULTS IN SENEGAL: MODEST RESULTS

Canadian government agents have a generally positive view of the results obtained under the New Alliance. This stance contrasts with that of several, if not most, private partners, NGOs, and international or Senegalese government officials who believe that the NAFSN’s accomplishments so far remain negligible relative to initial expectations. Indeed, even though Canada claims that the New Alliance has accelerated the implementation of programs and enactment of new laws, available evidence suggests that, as yet, it has not been not a primary driver of change in Senegal, be it reforms conducted by the Senegalese government, increased private investment in agriculture, or improved food security and nutrition. Overall, it is also difficult to measure which accomplishments are actually attributable to the New Alliance, as most actors had already programmed their activities before it was launched. This section analyzes the modest results achieved by stakeholders on the ground in light of stated goals.

6.1 Implementation of Food Security Objectives

So far, the influence of the New Alliance on food security seems limited to reviews of existing policies by the Senegalese government, which nevertheless may be seen as an accomplishment. The Policy Brief on Infant and Young Child Feeding, for instance, “was validated by the Minister of Health and implementation is underway.”²⁰⁸ The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare also started to revise decrees related to the Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes and the Codex Alimentarius, but the process was not completed as of 2015.²⁰⁹

The National Strategy of Food Security and Resilience was effectively updated under the aegis of the SE-CNSA. It is based on a policy document that was drafted in 2010 but not validated by political authorities at that time. The strategy includes the following overarching vision: “The Senegalese population, especially the most vulnerable to food and nutrition insecurity, has easier and sustainable access to sufficient, healthy and nutritious food with strong resilience capabilities by 2035.”²¹⁰ The strategy aims to coordinate various initiatives in the realm of food security, to provide general guidelines on the best response to food crises, as well as to achieve food security in the long term. The policy is yet to be operationalized into implementation plans.

Empirical evidence suggests that conditions imposed by Canada and the European Union have prompted the Senegalese government to accelerate the elaboration and adoption of the strategy in earnest.²¹¹ Canadian officials accompanied their Senegalese counterparts and attended meetings,

but do not appear to have steered the content of the strategy toward the goals of the New Alliance to promote the private sector.²¹² The strategy may help to revitalize the SE-CNSA, an agency that has been understaffed and underfunded since its creation. However, without sufficient means to ensure the monitoring of the various initiatives under the strategy, the document risks being shelved.

A second document, the National Policy for the Development of Nutrition, was adopted by the CLM under the New Alliance. It aims to “guarantee to all everywhere in the country a satisfactory nutritional status, notably among children under five, through the reduction of at least half of undernutrition occurrences and the halt of the progression of overweight and obesity.”²¹³ The document offers a comprehensive and nuanced assessment of the causes of malnutrition, and recognizes that women and children are particularly at risk. The policy articulates its actions around the concept of “nutritional self-sufficiency” in order to achieve diversified food diets with high nutritional values, and promote the consumption and processing of local products to remedy malnutrition. The policy also recommends bio-fortification, which consists of enriching staple crops with micronutrients through plant breeding. Finally, the policy invites the private sector to contribute to the production, transformation, and distribution of nutrient-rich food.

6.2 Policy Changes to Increase Private Investments in Agriculture

Progress reports indicate that, after a slow start in 2013, the Senegalese government performed better in meeting its commitments the following year. In total, the government was expected to fulfill 28 objectives before June 2015. Of this number, 18 – or 64% – were achieved. However, only 2 out of 6 nutrition-related goals were accomplished. In 2015-2016, data indicates that the government has attained 42% of the objectives it was due to meet before 2015 and 27% of its policy goals after 2015.²¹⁴

A general objective of the revised Cooperation Framework is to implement a simplified and business-friendly fiscal and judicial apparatus, improve the competitiveness of the agricultural sector, and promote “high impact” investment before 2016. As such, a new Code of Investment is in preparation and an application decree for the new Law on Public-Private Partnerships is under study. However, the 2014 annual review notes that the working committee for the new Code of Investment was ineffective. The 2015 report indicates that the “Harmonization of PPP legal and institutional frameworks is underway.”²¹⁵ Also, the Senegalese government has abandoned the idea of reducing corporate income tax from its current level of 30% to 25%.

The FONGIP, FONSI and BNDE have also been established and are operational. However, proponents of small-scale agriculture question these measures. One NGO representative, for instance, notes that funds the government dedicates to the FONGIP, FONSI, and BNDE could have been deployed to support small-scale farmers instead of private investors: “It is totally unclear to me. We are told that we need the G7 and the private sector to finance and implement the NAIP because governments do not have enough means. And I see the creation of funds [...] to support private investments in Senegal. I think that if there are available resources – because these instruments are set up by the state – they should be used to help family farms.”²¹⁶

The Senegalese government recently passed a decree so that enterprises registered under the Investment Code may now receive a full VAT (18%) exemption on agricultural equipment, after approval by a Commission in charge of ensuring that the material is destined for agricultural purposes.²¹⁷ This is probably one of the only measures that the NAFSN concretely expedited, although it had been discussed before Senegal joined the New Alliance. A NAFSN meeting allowed the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Finance to settle on this issue and elaborate the list of eligible items.²¹⁸

A few remarks on this decree. First, it only applies to companies accredited under the Investment Code, and not Economic Interest Groups (*Groupements d'Intérêts Économiques* – GIEs). In Senegal, most family farms, if they are registered at all, take the form of GIEs. It is also unlikely that these GIEs have the capacity to buy the kind of expensive equipment covered by the decree in the first place. The benefits of this new measure will thus mostly accrue to agribusiness. However, it does not seem to apply to companies registered as free export enterprises, ensuring at least that firms taking advantage of this policy sell their products on the domestic market. Finally, some experts question the soundness of further restricting the tax base of the state.²¹⁹

Despite these shortcomings, Canadian officials indicate that, overall, they are satisfied with Senegal's advancements on the 5 conditions identified to release Canada's budgetary support. They content that, in the long term, the New Alliance has set into motion a process of structural change that will yield results incrementally. Indeed, development takes time. However, several other stakeholders from the business sector and international donor community who believe that private investment in agriculture is the way forward find that the Senegalese government has not demonstrated enough leadership on the NAFSN.

6.3 Impacts of the NAFSN on Private Investment

The chief objective of the New Alliance is to foster private investment in agriculture as a means to enhance food security. This goal has not been attained so far, despite some policy changes effected by the Senegalese government to improve the country's business environment. The New Alliance is somehow based on wishful thinking; it assumes that private companies will automatically invest if the government pledges to improve the business climate, and that development will ensue by virtue of these policy revisions. However, barriers to investment are not limited to those enunciated by the NAFSN; changes in one indicator or area may not necessarily lead to increased investment.²²⁰

The number of the New Alliance's private partners in Senegal has fluctuated over time, but there are currently 36 companies involved in the initiative. Of this number, 29 are Senegalese, and 7 are foreign. However, several firms listed as being domestic are in fact subsidiaries of multinationals or are also active in several other countries.²²¹ That being said, major agribusiness corporations that have in the past attracted criticism because of their political influence, significant market power, and sometimes-controversial activities, such as Cargill and Monsanto, are absent as NAFSN participants in Senegal.²²² Contrary to some critiques, it is not evident that the NAFSN aimed to – or had the effect of – opening the domestic market to multinational companies. At least in Senegal, the New Alliance has not directly resulted in the creation of local enterprises or the arrival of foreign agribusiness companies.²²³

Since the NAFSN was launched, many companies have displayed a decreasing level of interest, if not an outright disappointment, in the initiative. Although external factors, such as turnovers in staff, might be at play, this feeling seems to be reflected in the review process. Several private partners did not make the effort to report on their progress in the last two reviews. For the First Progress Report, 89% of the companies completed their follow-up questionnaire. For the 2014-2015 report, only 52% of the companies submitted an evaluation to Grow Africa.²²⁴ This percentage dropped to 39% for the 2015-2016 review.²²⁵ The low response level makes it difficult to measure the New Alliance’s real progress in Senegal.

Despite this data deficit, the NAFSN claims that, between November 2013 and June 2014, private investments in Senegal created 1,990 jobs and positively affected 67,773 small-scale producers, a majority of whom (58,217 producers) had access to the direct purchase or procurement of inputs.²²⁶ In 2014-2015, private partners generated 926 jobs and reached 119,460 smallholders directly and indirectly, mainly through “financial and data services” (103,612 producers) and “input products and services” (52,400 producers).²²⁷ In 2015-2016, the NAFSN had an impact on 138,139 smallholders, primarily via “professional and managerial training” (70,615 smallholders).²²⁸ The number of smallholders tied to a production contract with a NAFSN private partner declined markedly from 48,392 in 2013-2014, to 41,912 in 2014-2015, and 2,732 in 2015-2016.

It is also difficult to accurately assess the effects of the New Alliance on gender-related issues. Only 17% of the smallholders reached by NAFSN private partners in 2013-2014 were women, against 14% 2014-2015 and 23% in 2015-2016. In 2015-2016, of the 926 jobs the NAFSN created, 40% were for women. In 2015-2016, women occupied 21% of the 4,226 new jobs generated by New Alliance private partners.²²⁹ These figures are the only available data on the impacts of the NAFSN on women in Senegal. Despite the NAFSN’s avowed commitment to empowering women, available data indicate that jobs created and services rendered by private partners mostly accrue to men.

Taken together, companies that have completed their questionnaires declared having invested \$134.75 million in 2013-2014 and \$34.1 million in 2014-2015. In 2015-2016, the total investment by 10 companies corresponded to \$22.29 million, for a cumulative amount of approximately \$191.14 million since the beginning of the NAFSN. This sum represents 30% of the global amount committed under the New Alliance in Senegal.²³⁰ While 7 companies achieved 100% of their planned investment, at least 15 letters of intent have been put on hold since the NAFSN was launched.²³¹

Table 2: Evolution of the Private Sector's Commitments under the New Alliance in Senegal

	Nov 2013- June 2014	July 2014 – June 2015	July 2015-June 2016
Number of completed surveys	32	17	14
Number of smallholders reached	67,773	119,460	138,139
Number of jobs created	1,990	926	4,226
Level of investment (\$)	134,748,000	34,108,000	22,292,400

In sum, many private partners are experiencing delays in the implementation of their projects, although some enterprises may have accomplished their commitments without reporting them to the New Alliance. However, NAFSN’s difficulties are probably also due to the lack of oversight in the selection of companies. It seems that the activities that firms planned opportunistically, in response to the NAFSN, have been pursued less thoroughly. Indeed, several commentators consider that

many commitments made under the New Alliance in Senegal were unrealistic. In contrast, serious businesses in Senegal are committed to carrying out their activities with or without the NAFSN, as they have emphasized during interviews.

Grow Africa has supported a few companies in Senegal in identifying their difficulties. For the moment, this assistance remains limited. Policy changes may, however, be accelerated in the future if Grow Africa were to become more involved. By facilitating the dialogue between private companies and national governments, Grow Africa aims to defend the interests of the private agribusiness sector. However, the pursuit of these interests may very well run counter to the food security goals the New Alliance purportedly aims to advance. In sum, there is a risk that Grow Africa's corporate agenda supersedes both Senegalese development priorities and food security imperatives.

Box 1. Rice Production in the Senegal River Delta: Comparing Two Business Models

The Senegalese government aims to attain rice self-sufficiency by 2017. Under the New Alliance, eight enterprises have promised to invest in the rice sector. Based on the results presented in the two progress reports, it appears that only Coumba Nor Thiam (CNT) and Compagnie agricole de Saint-Louis (CASL) have implemented their stated objectives in any sustained manner. CNT mainly offers agricultural services to small-scale producers and buys their crop at the end of the season. In contrast, CASL cultivates rice itself over large expanses of land. Both models have different implications for concerned communities, even though CNT and CASL combine the two business models to varying degrees.

Coumba Nor Thiam (CNT): Created in 1987, CNT is a Senegalese company that cultivates approximately 500 hectares per season on its own agricultural land.²³² In addition, it enters into production contracts with smallholders over 3,250 hectares per crop season, for a total of 7,000 hectares a year. The company does business with about 2,500 peasants, either on an individual basis or as members of 350 GIEs. Of this number, 4% of its customers – or 100 people – are women. CNT borrows funds from the National Bank for Agricultural Credit (*Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole du Sénégal* – CNCAS), buys seeds and fertilizers, and distributes them to peasants at the start of the crop year. CNT also provides harvest and processing services to farmers. Producers reimburse the company in bags of rice at the end of the season. After they have repaid their debt, farmers can keep or sell their surplus production as they see fit.

At the NAFSN's inception, CNT proposed plans for a series of investments over three years. They included developing "rice cultivation with a pump station for irrigation," creating a storage facility, buying cultivation and processing equipment, and acquiring a new transportation fleet. CNT's total commitment amounted to \$2 million. According to the first progress report, "Operations are fully set up and investment made. More than 6,000 small producers have been reached."²³³ The second progress report claims that CNT had fully honoured its commitments with banks, installed a pumping station to irrigate 2,000 hectares of land, and acquired two hydraulic excavators, one truck, and one combine harvester.

CNT's business model presents advantages for peasants in a context of decreasing state support for agriculture. CNT offers a more flexible solution to credit than the CNCAS, which imposes relatively restrictive loan and repayment terms. For instance, producers who default on their loans with the CNCAS may request a credit from CNT at the start of the agricultural season. CNT then reimburses the loan directly to CNCAS, thus absorbing the financial risk on behalf of individual peasants. CNT is unable to meet demand at the moment, as more producers solicit their services than they can support.

While these arrangements offer a short-term solution to financial difficulties, they remain an alternative to a banking system that is oblivious to rural realities and forces peasants into a perpetual cycle of indebtedness.

Because there is insufficient credit available to smallholders, CNT is able to charge relatively high interest rates. Individuals who repeatedly fail to reimburse CNT may have part of their land temporarily seized by the company until they pay off their debt. Some producers would prefer the liberty offered by the bank, which allows them to subcontract agricultural services to the enterprise of their choice. Overall, however, CNT meets smallholders' need for credit and machinery in the absence of other options.

Compagnie Agricole de Saint-Louis (CASL) : Founded in October 2011, CASL has received loans from the African Development Bank and the European Investment Bank. CASL “integrates the entire value chain, from land development to processing and sales under trademark.”²³⁴ In 2013, CASL announced that, within three years, it would develop 4,500 hectares of paddy fields, of which it will cultivate 4,000 hectares twice a year. It is also constructing a warehouse to dry and store 36,000 tons of rice and erecting a processing unit with a capacity of 16 tons/hour, or 70,000 tons a year. Finally, CASL intends to sign production contracts with smallholders for over 1,500 hectares annually. Expected investments total \$89 million.

CASL initially planned to cultivate rice in the Fouta region that borders the Senegal River Valley, but it was ousted from the first commune where it intended to implement its activities. CASL originally requested 4,000 hectares of land in one block. However, to accept the project, traditional landed elites asked for conditions that CASL deemed inadmissible. CASL then approached a second commune where it wanted 1,500 hectares, but residents, supported by the civil society organization ENDA Pronat, also rejected the company, fearing a case of land grab. CASL subsequently moved its activities to the Delta.

This time, CASL contacted landholders directly to obtain land. The firm acquired a little more than 2,000 hectares of land from two sets of actors.²³⁵ First, it negotiated with three villages located on the outskirts of the plantation. Some villages ceded a portion of their parcels in exchange for which the CASL developed land that producers could till themselves. Other villages decided instead to sell their land for \$250 per hectare. Second, the company also negotiated with individual owners who, for the most part, had acquired land around 1988.²³⁶ In this area, formal land allocations are considerably more widespread than in other regions of Senegal, limiting the likelihood that customary right holders would lose their land forcibly.

CASL's business model has both advantages and drawbacks for farmers. On the one hand, CASL employed a voluntary approach to access land. The compensation fees it offered are higher than those that most companies propose in similar deals. In absolute terms, however, they remain relatively small and represent a one-time payment for the permanent loss of a productive asset. Producers agreed to sell their land because of the employment prospects and the company's promise to provide water. CASL allows farmers to use its irrigation and drainage canals for a reasonable user fee. It has been reported that several people who were living outside the commune have returned to cultivate their land now that water is available. The firm also built a costly drainage system to desalinate land that individual producers cannot afford. As a result, the company is able to cultivate parcels that were left idle for many years.

On the other hand, several villagers who parted with their land indicated that they would have preferred to cultivate it themselves. CASL also benefits from access to public infrastructure, including an outfall²³⁷ erected with funds from the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). It also receives subsidized fertilizers. Because of its influence with the government, the company is able to obtain inputs before smaller producers.

Table 3. CNT and CASL compared

	CNT	CASL
Business model	Outgrower schemes +estate farm	Estate farm + outgrower schemes
Number of hectares per season	3,500	700 (4,000 planned)
Average yields	6.5 tonnes/ha	6 tonnes/ha
Number of direct jobs	35 permanent; 60-80 seasonal	158 permanent (250 planned)
Number of small-scale farmers	2,500	(1,000 planned)

To attain rice self-sufficiency, Senegal needs to bridge an important production gap. Companies such as CASL that cultivate vast areas may help supply the urban market with local rice and contribute to food security. For its part, CNT supports smallholders who practice farming in adverse conditions. Over the years, they have accumulated a technical mastery, resulting in yields similar or higher than those of CASL, an agribusiness that has substantial resources at its disposal. This is an important insight: small-scale agriculture has considerable potential that remains untapped. Offering greater support to family farmers could increase domestic rice production, while also providing rural employment.

6.4 Impacts of NAFSN Projects on Land and Seeds

Several critics are concerned that corporate projects under the banner of the New Alliance may prompt land grabs. Indeed, some private partners hoped that their participation in the NAFSN in Senegal would facilitate access to land. There is no indication that the New Alliance has helped conclude deals on behalf of investors, even though the Cooperation Framework insists on the importance of contractual arrangements *à la* PDIDAS. As a matter of fact, several NAFSN private partners lament that limited access to land still represents a major constraint to their investments.

Based on the author's calculations, if they were all executed, NAFSN projects in Senegal would have covered at least 71,229 hectares. Of this number, at least 17,659 hectares were supposed to be cultivated through contract-based schemes.²³⁸ Suneor planned to acquire 20,000 hectares of land to produce seeds, an endeavour that several NGOs viewed as a possible instance of land grabbing. This project is unlikely to come to fruition at the moment due to Suneor's internal problems.²³⁹

The seed certification program produced an estimated 10,972 tonnes of certified seeds in 2015, which is a small quantity.²⁴⁰ The three NAFSN progress reports in Senegal note that human resources, laboratories, and equipment are insufficient to run the program and ensure proper monitoring. Also, the 2015 Joint Review of the Agricultural Sector notes that the project of targeting recipients through a short messaging services (SMS) system encountered several glitches.

6.5 Limited Sense of Stakeholder Accountability

Canada declines to take responsibility for the measures adopted and the results obtained under the NAFSN. In the view of Canadian officials, "the New Alliance is neither a program nor a project." In consequence, they hold that Canada's accountability lies primarily with the G7 and is measured with respect to the achievement of its promises indicated in the Cooperation Framework. According to the Canadian team, Canada's main commitment is political. The country is responsible *vis-à-vis* its G7 peers, rather than to Senegal. Canadian staff also maintain that the most important indicator of the New Alliance is not the progress accomplished by the private sector and respect of their LOIs, but the steps taken by the Senegalese government on reforming its agricultural policy framework. In this view, the Cooperation Framework represents a tool to achieve better transparency and coherence in that it provides a snapshot of various projects and initiatives underway in the host country. The NAFSN offers a benchmark system that clarifies commitments, defines indicators, and ensures monitoring. The idea is to make stakeholder objectives public in order to increase their sense of accountability. Ultimately, the New Alliance is supposed to incentivize participants to respect the promises recorded in the Cooperation Framework.

In Senegal, however, stakeholders tend to pass the buck to each other and decline responsibility for the shortcomings of the NAFSN. NGOs point to the slow progress of the private sector to

underline the latter's ineffectiveness in comparison to smallholders. Firms blame the government for administrative delays in policy changes. The Senegalese government says that private companies find false pretenses not to implement their commitments. State officials also remark that, while the government exhaustively reviews its progress each year, many members of the private sector do not report on their accomplishments. Consequently, the Senegalese government has an incomplete knowledge of businesses' level of investment under the New Alliance.

Several actors, including private partners, recognize that the companies' achievements are disappointing in light of the LOIs. A CEO opines: "There are people who submitted letters of intent. They have abandoned but their letters are still there [in the Cooperation Framework]. They gave enormous numbers for their letters of intent The Senegalese state publicly committed to the New Alliance on this basis. These companies must answer for their actions!"²⁴¹ One governmental official also remarks: "For the NAFSN, we received a lot of letters of intention. A lot! There was optimism. [...] But in terms of achievements, we are disappointed. We realized that the declaration of intent is one thing but the materialization of that declaration is another."²⁴²

These results seem partly related to the inner logic of the NAFSN, which has no means to enforce commitments.²⁴³ While some CEOs consider that they have a moral responsibility to fulfill their pledges, many do not feel obliged to do so. As one private partner explains: "It is true that commitments are public. But there is no binding character attached to these commitments if no accompaniment measures are offered in return. I have very clear objectives, but their realization depends on my capacity to raise funds. If I do not find them and do not fulfill my pledges, no one can hit me over the head because the NAFSN does not help me to find means of achieving them."²⁴⁴ When interviewed about their accomplishments, some members of the New Alliance had even forgotten the content of their commitments.

6.6 Senegal in Perspective: Regional Consequences of the NAFSN

The NAFSN has not yet exerted profound and visible impacts on agriculture in Senegal, at least in comparison to the hype generated at its inception. This modest influence seems partly due to the fact that since the 2000s, Senegal has been pursuing multiple initiatives to attract private investment in agriculture. The effects of the New Alliance may appear more pronounced for countries that were less inclined to support the private sector in the past. The lack of perceptible results in Senegal is also attributable to a steady demobilization of NAFSN stakeholders. In particular, if the Senegalese government continues to encourage private investment in agriculture, it does not necessarily do so anymore in reference to the NAFSN.

The overall level of actualized private investments in the ten African countries of the New Alliance remains low. As of September 2016, private companies taking part in the NAFSN had only invested \$2.99 billion as a whole, representing 25% of the \$12.15 billion promised since 2012.²⁴⁵ According to Grow Africa's executive director, William Asiko, the disparity between commitments and realizations is attributable to policy uncertainty, suggesting that some African states may be slow to implement changes that incentivize private investment, and that reforms effectively conducted require time to produce visible results. In this general context of low achievements, the NAFSN progresses unevenly, depending on each government's political will and country's socio-economic situation.

The level of aid money provided by the G7 that countries actually expend can be used as a proxy to measure their engagement with the NAFSN. As of March 2014, Senegal had expended²⁴⁶ 45.6% of its planned funding, or \$122.85 million of an expected amount of \$269.26 million. Only Ivory Coast had a lower disbursement rate (13.7%). Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, and Tanzania all used more funds in absolute terms than Senegal. In 2015, Senegal also exhibited a low rate against disbursements planned to date: it expended only 59% of available funds (\$334.36 million as of June 2015). This figure indicates an improvement on last year, but remains low in comparison of Burkina Faso (531%), Malawi (421%) or Mozambique (233%).²⁴⁷

According to NAFSN's criteria of success, East African countries seem to perform better. For instance, Asiko regards Ethiopia as doing well at promoting a business-friendly environment. In his view, this country has adopted "very sound policies," including the creation of agro-processing zones, the establishment of land banks, and the improvement of road infrastructure.²⁴⁸ Among West African countries, Nigeria has been keen to use the New Alliance framework to guide its policy changes and collaborate with the newly created Nigeria Agribusiness Group, a private-sector coalition. According to a Grow Africa representative, the Nigerian government embraces the New Alliance as a vehicle to restructure agriculture and transform it into a business. In this country, NAFSN objectives seem to be advancing more quickly.

Other states are more inconsistent. Ivory Coast elaborated its Cooperation Framework shortly after it had emerged from civil war. In this context, the government was more vulnerable to pressure from foreign donors. MNCs also dominate in the NAFSN in Ivory Coast due to the decline of the domestic private sector following the period of violence.²⁴⁹ However, Ivory Coast eventually withdrew from a 100,000-hectare rice production deal signed with Louis Dreyfus Commodities that was included under the NAFSN.²⁵⁰ As of November 2015, the New Alliance was also reportedly progressing slowly in Burkina Faso. Several measures contained in the country's Cooperation Framework were recycled items from previous initiatives, such as the Agropole Bagré, an agricultural corridor project that generated criticism from peasant organizations.²⁵¹

At the other end of the spectrum, Benin seems to have designed a Cooperation Framework that is more considerate of smallholders. For instance, the country favoured national firms instead of MNCs in its choice of private partners (22 enterprises are local while 2 are foreign).²⁵² Benin is also one of the four countries that accepted projects carried out by producer organizations.²⁵³ As mentioned previously, it is the only government that took *new* measures on questions of nutrition (Senegal and Ivory Coast simply reiterated existing commitments in their Cooperation Frameworks). Finally, Benin is the only country that has developed indicators to gauge the impacts of the NAFSN on women.²⁵⁴ At least on paper, Benin has crafted a more balanced approach to agricultural development under the New Alliance.

Variable approaches and results between countries do not mean that the whole enterprise is devoid of consequences at the continental level. As one NGO representative observes: "there is no explicit homogenisation of policies, but implicitly it is evident that the role and the place of the private sector in national frameworks for accessing resources is a constant feature of the New Alliance."²⁵⁵ The NAFSN represents a building block in a global landscape of initiatives that have

sought to reshape Africa's agriculture since the 2000s.²⁵⁶ As such, the New Alliance should not be considered in isolation. While its direct impact remains limited in Senegal, it may have cumulative effects when combined with other efforts that aim to liberalize seeds and land in Africa. These initiatives may disproportionately benefit agribusiness to the detriment of smallholders.

CONCLUSION

The New Alliance aims to create an environment conducive to increased private investment in African agriculture. While some studies have assessed the impacts of the initiative in various countries, none has examined the specific role of Canada in this program. Additionally, many of the existing reports draw on a documentary analysis, not empirical research. This study specifically aims to remedy this lacuna with a particular focus on Senegal, and to provide an account based on field research. This research has found the following answers to the series of questions asked by the FSPG.

What is Canada's involvement in the NAFSN?

As a facilitator, Canada has liaised with the Senegalese government, private enterprises, aid donors, and CSOs to implement the NAFSN. In this capacity, Canada has mostly accompanied the Senegalese state in drafting documents and convening meetings. While Canada invited Senegal to join the NAFSN, it has not intervened in the specific content of the policy changes initiated by the Senegalese government a position that, in principle, encourages Senegal to have local ownership over the direction of the New Alliance within its borders. The government of Senegal seems indeed to have retained a relative degree of independence in the definition of its priorities, at least initially. Canada's involvement in the New Alliance in Senegal has gradually declined since it was launched.

What initiatives have been supported by Canada through the NAFSN?

Canada did not take part in the selection process and does not fund NAFSN private partners. Its financial help under the New Alliance in Senegal falls into three categories: agricultural programs, budgetary support, and logistical assistance. The Canadian Embassy in Senegal approved or renewed most of its flagship programs related to agricultural development and food security between 2009 and 2012, before the New Alliance was created. These programs count toward Canada's financial pledges to the NAFSN. In addition, Canada has recently made the release of its budgetary support conditional on the Senegalese state fulfilling five objectives delineated in its Cooperation Framework. Finally, Canada has financed the organization of workshops and hiring of external consultants to assist the Senegalese government in steering NAFSN activities. Overall, Canada does not appear to have dedicated new funds to Senegal, but has rather rerouted money. Nevertheless, the NAFSN has seemingly provided political support to maintain funds and projects at a greater level than might have been the case without Canada's lead role in Senegal.

What is the motivation for the Senegalese government and the private sector to engage in the NAFSN?

At first, stakeholders who agreed to participate in the New Alliance had high expectations for the initiative. The Senegalese government was hopeful about the NAFSN because it largely corresponded to its vision of agriculture. Indeed, since the 2000s, the leitmotif of the Senegalese state has been that agricultural development is to be achieved through increased private

investment, although family farms must be preserved. Besides, Senegal did not want to be excluded from a global initiative that seemed major at the time. For their part, private partners hoped to strengthen their political leverage with the Senegalese government, improve their corporate visibility, and establish commercial partnerships.

What are the underlying assumptions of the projects funded through the NAFSN?

Companies that participate in the NAFSN do not receive direct financial support. The NAFSN has not defined clear guidelines to choose private partners in Senegal. The goal was rather to recruit as many enterprises as possible. The selection process was devolved to Monitor Deloitte, a consulting firm paid by USAID. Some companies were already supported by USAID or the US Embassy. Others were in touch with APIX. Because the NAFSN has not screened private partners in a systematic fashion, it has admitted some companies with rather unrealistic letters of intention. Most of them had already planned the activities they communicated in their LOIs. While the operations or approach of some private partners involved in the New Alliance in Senegal are perhaps questionable from the perspective of those who advocate for family agriculture and ecological practices, other NAFSN companies support small-scale farmers through sourcing schemes, processing activities, or access to credit and services.

How do stakeholders perceive results achieved by the NAFSN?

Senegal has made efforts in the past to improve its business environment for entrepreneurs. Indeed, the Senegalese state had previously internalized the vision promoted by international policy circles that private investment in agriculture is advisable. Canadian and Senegalese officials consider that the New Alliance has offered an additional opportunity for the government to center the discussion on the specific preoccupations and needs of the private sector and to better take them into account. However, it is possible to sense that the Senegalese government has gradually distanced itself from the NAFSN.

Indeed, the momentum the New Alliance mustered at the outset progressively withered away. Most stakeholders, be they opponents or proponents of the NAFSN, consider the tangible results obtained in Senegal to be below expectations so far. Assessment of the program reveals a shared lack of ownership and sense of disappointment. Given the relatively simplistic solution to agricultural development that the NAFSN offers, it is not entirely surprising that its impacts are limited. For the moment, it remains difficult to ascertain how private investment in agribusiness may foster food security and nutrition, although the entire enterprise is based on this posited relationship. Another theoretical assumption underpinning the New Alliance is that the private sector is a critical lever in alleviating poverty. The Senegalese case study provides little evidence to this effect.

These modest results are due to a number of factors. The New Alliance essentially functions as an umbrella that gathers multiple governmental, private, and donor projects with no compulsory mechanisms to enforce its objectives. The NAFSN in Senegal represents yet another initiative in a context where several parallel and overlapping agricultural programs already existed or were created in the meantime. It basically reorganizes money and programs to fit a paradigm of agricultural development that now explicitly includes the private sector. Most stakeholders involved in the NAFSN seem to have their own agenda, which they would probably have pursued

whether or not the initiative was created. Several commitments announced in the Cooperation Framework were already planned. The New Alliance appears to rebrand existing governmental objectives, donor funds, and companies' business plans with limited added value.

How has the NAFSN in Senegal and other African member countries influenced policies related to land and seed laws?

The NAFSN does not visibly have the same deleterious impacts on land and seed laws in Senegal that critics have pointed to elsewhere. In that country, the New Alliance focuses on the production of certified seeds but does not limit the use and exchange of peasant seeds. Neither does it modify the current law on GMOs or introduce new seed legislation. Senegal had already initiated a land reform before the NAFSN was established, indicating that it would have conducted this change regardless of the New Alliance. While the New Alliance encourages the implicit homogenisation of agricultural policies across participant countries, it is not a binding agreement. African countries display varying levels of interest and involvement in the NAFSN. In brief, the New Alliance represents an additional force in fostering private investment in agriculture, but is not in itself a determinant instrument of change.

Are there lessons to learn from the NAFSN that can inform policy on private sector and public partnerships using Official Development Assistance (ODA)?

In sum, the NAFSN in Senegal is neither a panacea for the problems plaguing agriculture as its proponents argue, nor the cunning scheme to subjugate Africa to capital as portrayed by its detractors. Although not all their worries have been supported by evidence, critics still have some well-founded concerns about the NAFSN. While agriculture in Africa undeniably requires additional funds, the NAFSN has included companies as development partners in a relatively uncritical way. The NAFSN in Senegal has not empirically demonstrated so far that the involvement of private enterprises in agriculture leads to better development outcomes. The transformation of agriculture and the commodification of land entail risks for small-scale farmers who still contribute overwhelmingly to food production in Africa. Giving greater consideration to the potential negative repercussions that private investment in agriculture can have for small-scale farmers would strengthen the New Alliance.

On the other hand, agricultural businesses in Senegal are admittedly confronted with difficulties that limit their capacity to supply the domestic food market. These companies have made demands on the government that can benefit small-scale farmers (e.g. improvement of transportation infrastructure, a decrease in electricity tariffs or better agricultural training). They can also provide business opportunities to smallholders. However, more attention should be given to the specific needs of family farming to ensure that private partnerships reach smallholders in a truly beneficial manner.

Canadian staff in Senegal has used the New Alliance as an opportunity to deepen policy dialogue with the Senegalese government. Canada already carries out excellent agricultural programs supporting Senegalese smallholders, which could be enhanced by the inclusion of family farms into governmental policies. In a context where it has been largely neglected for more than two decades, smallholder agriculture exhibits unexploited potential. The Senegalese government itself has committed to support family agriculture alongside agribusiness. Canada could also use the platform

of exchanges created for civil society organizations under the NAFSN to enrich the content of its own agricultural programs.

The inclusion of private partners in agricultural development was not mentioned whatsoever in CIDA's 2009 Food Security Strategy, although it makes reference to value chains. If Canada wishes to pursue this direction, strategic thinking based on empirical evidence on the relationship between private investment and poverty reduction is required.²⁵⁷ If Canada continues to support the strengthening of value chains, another avenue would be to reinforce farmers' organizations so that they can successfully claim advantageous commercial policies from the government, negotiate fair and inclusive contract terms with private partners, or even set up their own sourcing and processing structures.²⁵⁸ In sum, Canada is invited to pay attention to priorities established by national governments, as well as civil society and farmers, in a spirit of genuine country ownership.

ENDNOTES

¹ The NAFSN was launched before Russia was expelled from the G8 in March 2014. For the sake of clarity, “G7” will be used throughout the report.

² The White House 2012.

³ Each African country has a lead partner from the G7 under the New Alliance. Benin is paired with Germany; Burkina Faso with France; Ivory Coast and Malawi with the European Union; Ethiopia, Ghana, and Tanzania with the United States; Mozambique with Japan and the United States; and Nigeria with the United Kingdom.

⁴ Government of Canada 2013.

⁵ All informants in the study were offered anonymity. To conceal the identity of the interviewees, their names and specific positions are not revealed in this report. In addition, although the opinions that individuals have on the New Alliance may differ, they are referred to as a group in order to avoid identification and potential blaming of participants to this research.

⁶ All amounts are expressed in Canadian dollars (\$), unless otherwise stated. Foreign currencies have been converted to Canadian dollars with the website Oanda, using corresponding dates when possible.

⁷ *L’Aquila Joint Statement on Global Food Security* ([http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/LAquila_Joint_Statement_on_Global_Food_Security\[1\],o.pdf](http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/LAquila_Joint_Statement_on_Global_Food_Security[1],o.pdf)), Accessed 01/03/2017).

⁸ Wise and Murphy 2012, 14.

⁹ De Schutter, Preface, in Jamart et al. 2014, 7. According to AFSI’s Final Report, as of December 14, 2012, AFSI donors had “disbursed 67 percent of the total pledge, with Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom at full disbursement”. <http://www.state.gov/s/globalfoodsecurity/rls/rpt/laquila/202837.htm#3> (Accessed 20/09/2016).

¹⁰ De Schutter 2015, 14.

¹¹ The full content of the LOIs was not made public due to business confidentiality considerations.

¹² <http://www.caadnet/about-us> (Accessed November 3, 2015).

¹³ <http://www.nepad.org/nepad/knowledge/doc/1787/imaputo-declaration> (Accessed 03/11/2015).

¹⁴ http://www.hubrural.org/IMG/pdf/final_report_minsiter_stmc-aewr_dec_2017.pdf (Accessed 06/02/2017).

¹⁵ <https://new-alliance.org/commitments> (Accessed 14/08/2016).

¹⁶ New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa 2014, 9. Note that to “oversee and implement” is not to decide the content in the first place.

¹⁷ The White House 2012.

¹⁸ *Leadership Council Terms of Reference*. September 2014, http://new-alliance.org/sites/default/files/resources/Leadership%20Council_Terms%20of%20Reference_Sept%202014%20final.pdf (Accessed 02/11/2015).

¹⁹ The composition of the council in 2014 was posted on the New Alliance website (<http://www.new-alliance.org/sites/default/files/resources/2014%20Leadership%20Council%20Members.pdf>, accessed 03/11/2015). However, the list for 2015 and 2016 was not made available.

²⁰ <https://www.growafrica.com> (Accessed 28/08/2016). The two countries that participate in Grow Africa but not in the NAFSN are Kenya and Rwanda. According to WEF, “Grow Africa was inspired by a partnership approach developed by Tanzanian and global leaders, supported by the World Economic Forum’s New Vision for Agriculture initiative, during 2009-2011. In 2010, President Jakaya Kikwete requested the Forum’s support to mobilize private-sector investment and public-private sector cooperation in support of Tanzania’s national agriculture priorities. At the president’s request, a multistakeholder task force developed a blueprint for investment in the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) [...]” This partnership led to the creation of Grow Africa at the regional level (2016, 4).

²¹ New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa 2014, 8.

²² Interview with a Grow Africa representative, Dakar, January 14, 2016.

²³ Grow Africa does not define value chains in its official document. In the literature, value chains broadly refer to the sequence of activities from conception to consumption of a product. At each segment of the chain, a set of actors or companies adds value to a product. In the agricultural sector, a value chain can be broken down into 5 major stages: 1) Research and development (companies create innovative products); 2) Input distribution (companies sell seeds,

fertilizers, machinery, and infrastructure to producers); 3) Farming (farmers produce and harvest); 4) Sourcing and trading (companies buy and market raw agricultural products); 5) Processing and manufacturing (companies transform and package agricultural products); 6) Retail and export (companies sell finished products to other firms and consumers) (Gradl 2012, 16-17). A value chain can be local or global, with different risks and opportunities for smallholders.

²⁴ <https://www.feedthefuture.gov/article/scaling-seeds-and-technologies-partnership-will-accelerate-progress-reduce-hunger-poverty> (Accessed 26/09/2016).

²⁵ <http://agra.org/new-partnership-to-strengthen-the-private-seed-and-agricultural-inputs-sector-in-senegal-with-thousands-of-farmers-to-benefit/> (Accessed 29/04/2016).

²⁶ White 2013, 2.

²⁷ White 2013, 13.

²⁸ McKeon 2014.

²⁹ Curtis 2015.

³⁰ Curtis 2015; Diedhiou 2013; Jamart et al. 2014; McKeon 2014.

³¹ Jamart et al. 2014, 24-25.

³² New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa 2015, 1.

³³ White 2013, 18.

³⁴ White 2013, 22.

³⁵ De Schutter 2015, 12; 34.

³⁶ McKeon 2014, 8.

³⁷ In the context of this study, 4 criteria are employed to define family farms. 1) Family farms mostly rely on non-salaried family labour to accomplish agricultural activities. 2) They also consume part or totality of their production for their subsistence needs or use revenues from cash crops for that purpose. 3) Family farmers are often smallholders who cultivate small land areas. 4) The farm capital and productive assets are part of the family patrimony, but they are usually negligible, if not insufficient, to procure inputs, yield agricultural surpluses, and ensure livelihoods above the poverty line (Bosc et al. 2015, FAO 2012). In contrast, entrepreneurial agriculture 1) exclusively relies on hired labour that does not own the means of production (Bosc et al. 2015, 43), 2) produces for the market only, 3) often takes place on vast swathes of land or plantations, 4) is heavily mechanized and dependent on inputs. Although family farming is often opposed to agribusiness as exclusive categories, in actuality, “there exists a gradient of situations” between the two. Family business agriculture is an intermediate model, in which the family owns the capital, but employs permanent salaried labour and only consumes a residual portion of its production (Bosc et al. 2015). The hiring of employees or partial mechanization can lead to an increase in cultivated areas, indicating that family farmers are not necessarily smallholders.

³⁸ Bichard 2014, 15.

³⁹ De Schutter 2015, 18.

⁴⁰ Patel et al. 2015, 23.

⁴¹ Diédhiou 2013.

⁴² For instance, Jamart et al. calculate that, of a total of 213 projects between 2012 and 2013, 119 were conducted by multinationals or their subsidiaries, while only 94 were carried out by African firms in their domestic markets. Four multinationals (United Phosphorous Limited, Export Trading Group, Cargill, and Yara) are present in at least four countries under the NAFSN, for a total of 18 projects (Jamart et al. 2014, 27).

⁴³ Hong 2012. Grow Africa also claims that 70% of the companies that signed LOIs are African-owned (WEF 2016, 5).

⁴⁴ Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf> (Accessed 23/08/2015).

⁴⁵ White 2013, 12.

⁴⁶ McKeon 2014, 14.

⁴⁷ Patel et al. 2015, 23.

⁴⁸ Citation from a White House press release, mentioned in Murphy and Wise 2012; Henriques 2013, 6.

⁴⁹ Provost, Ford, and Tran 2014.

⁵⁰ McKeon 2014, 12.

⁵¹ Provost et al. 2014.

⁵² Diedhiou 2013.

⁵³ Four private companies of the New Alliance (Monsanto, Dupont Pioneer, Syngenta and Limagrain) control more than 50% of the global seed market (Jamart et al. 2014, 43;45).

⁵⁴ Hong 2013. “[M]ost investments (by quantity) are focused on sourcing more crops from smallholder farmers. In addition, projected investment dollar amounts, which are only provided for about two-thirds of the projects, show that both sourcing/trading and farming are at the top of the agenda.” The author calculates that NAFSN investments in sourcing and trading amount to US\$2,793,150,000, while companies intend to invest US\$152,660,000 in the input sector.

⁵⁵ McKeon 2014, 12.

⁵⁶ Jamart et al. 2014, 45.

⁵⁷ Bailey 2012.

⁵⁸ Jamart et al. 2014, 39.

⁵⁹ McKeon 2014, 12.

⁶⁰ Curtis 2015, 7; Jamart et al. 2014, 39.

⁶¹ De Schutter 2015, 19.

⁶² Jamart et al. 2014, 40.

⁶³ Curtis 2015, 5.

⁶⁴ Curtis 2015, 12. The author distinguishes between land grabs that lead to dispossession in violation of human rights and large-scale land acquisitions that do not necessarily involve the expulsion of current users. Curtis specifies in a footnote that the figure reported in the main text for Senegal also comprises land attributed under the Sustainable and Inclusive Agribusiness Development Project financed by the World Bank (*Projet de Développement Inclusif et Durable de l’Agrobusiness au Sénégal – PDIDAS*): “51,730 hectares of land allocated to New Alliance companies and 55,000 hectares of land allocated under the PDIDAS project” (2015, 37, footnote 50). After ActionAid’s report was published, PDIDAS was sized down to 10,000 hectares. Even though the PDIDAS is mentioned in Senegal’s NAFSN framework, they are two distinct initiatives. The author also amalgamates another contested project, Senhuile-Senéthanol, with the NAFSN.

⁶⁵ McKeon 2014, 10.

⁶⁶ Jamart et al. 2014, 32; Wise 2015.

⁶⁷ Curtis 2015, 5.

⁶⁸ McKeon 2014, 10 ; Curtis 2015, 6. Senegal plans to create agricultural corridors, but it does not cite this as an objective in its Cooperation Framework.

⁶⁹ Jamart et al. 2014, 31.

⁷⁰ Curtis 2015, 16.

⁷¹ Jamart et al. 2014, 34.

⁷² <http://eba.worldbank.org> (Accessed 24/07/2016).

⁷³ Jamart et al. 2014, 33.

⁷⁴ Murphy and Wise 2012. See also Henriques 2013.

⁷⁵ *Call of Civil Society Organizations to their Governments on the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa*, released at the World Social Forum in Tunis in March 2015 (<http://www.actionaid.org/2015/06/call-civil-society-organizations-their-governments-new-alliance-food-security-and-nutrition->, Accessed 29/08/2016). Several Senegalese NGOs have endorsed the declaration: ASPSP, Enda Pronat, Fahamu - Réseaux pour la justice sociale, Fédération des ONG du Sénégal (FONGS - Action paysanne), Forum social sénégalais (FSS), African Network on the Right to Food (ANORF), WILDAAF/Sénégal.

⁷⁶ Patel et al. 2015, 22 -23.

⁷⁷ Jamart et al. 2014, 47. Ivory Coast and Senegal have not elaborated new measures. They simply pledged to implement existing regulations.

⁷⁸ Jamart et al. 2014, 50.

⁷⁹ Jamart et al. 2014, 51-52; McKeon 2014, 13. Conclusions about the effects of agribusiness on gender relations are however mixed. On the one hand, “The literature on contract farming suggests that land access may shift from women, who cultivate subsistence crops, to men, who are more likely to sign contracts for cash crops with agribusiness” (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010, 88). On the other hand, women can be hired as farm labourers. For women, wage employment in large-scale estate production (in contrast to smallholder contract farming) can help to reduce gender inequalities and open new opportunities for economic independence (Maertens and Swinnen 2009).

⁸⁰ Curtis 2015, 31.

⁸¹ Jamart 2014, 51. Senegal's Cooperation Framework includes a policy indicator to "Reduce the gender gap in access and control over productive assets and resources," but reviews do not monitor its achievement. The omission of gender issues in New Alliance Cooperation Frameworks might reflect the fact that women's empowerment in agriculture does not represent a priority for African countries – an attitude that may be difficult to change if one is to respect the principle of national ownership.

⁸² Bichard 2014; Curtis 2015, 33; Diedhiou 2013; McKeon 2014, 12.

⁸³ Jamart 2014, 35.

⁸⁴ Jamart 2014, 36.

⁸⁵ Provost et al. 2014.

⁸⁶ Diedhiou 2013

⁸⁷ <https://blogs.oxfam.org/en/blogs/14-10-06-leaving-leadership-council-new-alliance-food-security-and-nutrition> (Accessed 27/08/2016).

⁸⁸ McKeon 2014, 13.

⁸⁹ <http://www.new-alliance.org/resource/2014-leadership-council-members> (Accessed 24/08/2016).

⁹⁰ Personal communication with ROPPA representative, Dakar, 12/01/2016.

⁹¹ Created in March 2015, the CAADP Non-State Actors Coalition (CNC) is "a platform to unite farmers' groups, civil society organizations, and private sector actors. This coalition of non-government organizations and networks is growing, with more than 100 organizations from 45 nations identified so far" (<https://www.feedthefuture.gov/article/grassroots-african-coalition-fights-inclusive-food-policies-more-action>, Accessed 24/01/2017).

⁹² African Union Commission, and CAADP NSA Coalition 2016.

⁹³ *Fertile Ground. Assessing CIDA's investments in food and farming.* July 2013. http://www.ccic.ca/_files/en/working_groups/2013_07_19_Fertile_Ground_FSPG.pdf (Accessed 30/08/2016).

⁹⁴ Prime Minister of Canada Stephen Harper 2012.

⁹⁵ Prime Minister of Canada Stephen Harper 2012. The G20 instituted GAFSP in 2009 to coordinate official development assistance committed under AFSI.

⁹⁶ The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) reports a similar situation in the United Kingdom: "Approximately £600 million of UK Government expenditure is designated as New Alliance expenditure. There is a misconception among certain parts of the media and civil society that this is an additional £600 million being used to support commercial activities. In fact, the majority of this expenditure, approximately £480 million, consists of pre-existing agricultural programs which have been relabelled as New Alliance programs" (2015, 5).

⁹⁷ In terms of volumes disbursed, the United States has expended the largest amount – \$1.7 billion – to the New Alliance so far, followed by the European Union and the United Kingdom. Italy disbursed the lowest amount – \$15.87 million (New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition and Grow Africa 2015, 9; 26).

⁹⁸ Data is available for Ethiopia, Ghana and Senegal. Only Japan fares better with a disbursement rate of 144% against prorated commitments. In comparison, Italy has the lowest rate of disbursements to date (19%) (New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition and Grow Africa 2015, 9; 26).

⁹⁹ For instance, Italy launched AFSI in 2009, while Canada announced the Muskoka Initiative at the G7 Summit in June 2010.

¹⁰⁰ Senegal would have been approached as a prospective signatory of the NAFSN ahead of Obama's visit to Dakar (Interview with an USAID official, Dakar, December 21, 2015).

¹⁰¹ With the exception of Belisle Solution Nutrition Inc. – Le Ranch de Ouassadou, a joint venture between a Canadian company and a Senegalese one, they were indeed no Canadian firms participating in the NAFSN. This joint venture subsequently withdrew from the New Alliance. No Canadian company has joined the New Alliance in Senegal since.

¹⁰² Interview with a Canadian official, Ottawa, April 26, 2016.

¹⁰³ Interview with a Canadian official, Ottawa, April 26, 2016.

¹⁰⁴ Canadian funding for international food assistance and nutrition has continued to grow in the past years. Despite the increase, Canada's overall spending on aid to agriculture declined from a high of \$670 million in 2009-2010 to \$346 million in 2014-2015, while support for agricultural research remained constant over the same period (FSPG 2016). ODA for agriculture decreased to pre-AFSI levels (FSPG 2015).

¹⁰⁵ Interview with a Canadian official, telephone follow-up, July 7, 2016.

¹⁰⁶ Despite numerous requests, it has been impossible to obtain Canada's yearly funds for agriculture in Senegal. It seems complicated to break down the total budget by specific items. However, all but one of the interviewed Canadian officials hold that the NAFSN has not led to a budget increase.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with a Canadian official, Dakar, December 4, 2015.

¹⁰⁸ <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/cpo.nsf/vWebCSAZEn/44EA8B00E4B48D7785257E610035A62C> (Accessed 22/09/2016). "Canada will also provide \$20 million in technical assistance to help various departments manage public funds and ensure service delivery to the Senegalese population" (Global Affairs Canada 2016).

¹⁰⁹ Activities under the Budgetary Support to the Plan Sénégal Émergent include "(1) support for the Senegalese government to develop and implement public policies, streamlined processes and tax incentives to stimulate growth in the agricultural and extractive sectors; (2) development and implementation of a national strategy to promote food security and nutrition; (3) development of instruments to effectively manage public spending; and (4) technical assistance in the form of advice, training and equipment for government employees." According to the author's calculations, nutrition and agricultural programs account for 60% of the program's budget. <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/cpo.nsf/vWebCSAZEn/44EA8B00E4B48D7785257E610035A62C> (Accessed 22/09/2016).

¹¹⁰ The African Union and NEPAD request that every country produces such a report. To conduct the 2014-2015 review, the Senegalese government received assistance from Africa Lead, "USAID's primary capacity building program in sub-Saharan Africa."

¹¹¹ Combined together, the variable tranches come to \$5 million, bringing the total annual budgetary support to \$10 million.

¹¹² The European Union also required that the strategy be completed for disbursing parts of its 11th Development Fund, which entered into force on March 1, 2015. One of the focal sectors of the fund concerns food security and agriculture. However, the NAFSN is not mentioned in the document. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/nip-senegal-edf11-2014_fr_o.pdf (Accessed 29/08/2016).

¹¹³ One condition attached to the variable portion of the budgetary support is not related to food security.

¹¹⁴ USAID financed the review of the private sector and DAPSA evaluated governmental commitments.

¹¹⁵ République du Sénégal 2014b, 19.

¹¹⁶ In comparison, the United States had disbursed \$230.51 million (République du Sénégal 2015a, 27).

¹¹⁷ According to 2015 Joint Agricultural Review, Canada's disbursements as of December 31, 2014 amounted to \$33.2 million. As of December 31, 2015, this sum was estimated at \$68.28 million (République du Sénégal 2016b, 59).

¹¹⁸ The NAIP political committee depends on the office of the Prime Minister, while the NAIP technical committee falls under the authority of DAPSA at the Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Equipment (*Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Équipement Rural* - MAER).

¹¹⁹ USAID and Monitor Deloitte also began to think about possible policy reforms before the NAFSN was formally launched in Senegal and seemingly discussed these recommendations with the government. Some of them were not incorporated as specific commitments in the Cooperation Framework, regarding for instance lease-financing. A few others appear as policy objectives, such as better targeting recipients of agricultural subsidies.

¹²⁰ Bichard 2014, 13. This seems to correspond to a typical pattern, however. In Malawi, the Cooperation Framework was released three months after the country had joined the New Alliance (Patel et al. 2015).

¹²¹ Interview with a Senegalese official, Dakar, 04/01/2016.

¹²² Bichard 2014, 13.

¹²³ Interview with a Senegalese official, phone interview, 28/05/2016. In total, at least 8 Senegalese companies of the New Alliance are also assisted by the US under the guise of different aid programs in Senegal. Typically, US programs do offer expert and technical support but does not provide funds.

¹²⁴ Nonetheless, Canada subsequently facilitated the accession of the *Association Sénégalaise pour la Promotion du Développement par la Base* (ASPRODEB) to the New Alliance. ASPRODEB is the technical arm of the National Council for Rural Cooperation (*Conseil National de Concertation et de Coopération des Ruraux* - CNCR), the largest and most representative peasant organization in Senegal.

¹²⁵ Bichard 2014, 14.

¹²⁶ <https://www.land-links.org/2013/06/g8-takes-steps-to-improve-land-governance-enhance-transparency/> (Accessed 09/12/2016). "The partnership is aimed at helping train officials (including local authorities) and civil society

representatives on the principles of land tenure as set out in the *Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests* and the *African Framework on Land Policy*, on reform land law. It will set up a database and a Land Observatory on land transactions and put in place training and information to help Senegal get the best out of commercial land deals”

(https://www.donorplatform.org/index.php?option=com_cobalt&task=files.download&tmpl=component&id=2422&fid=15&fidx=0&rid=2131&return=aHRocHM6Ly93d3cuZG9ub3JwbGFoZm9ybS5vcmcvY29iYWxoP3NoYXJ0PTM2MA%3D%3D (Accessed 09/12/2016)). Although some NGOs have criticized this partnership, its objectives on paper seem benign.

¹²⁷ According to Jamart et al., USAID funds the African Union’s committee in charge of overseeing the NAFSN (2016, 10).

¹²⁸ In her address on the occasion of the annual review of Canada’s bilateral cooperation program with Senegal on August 30, 2016, the Minister of International Development, Marie-Claude Bibeau, does not mention the New Alliance in Senegal (<http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1119129>, accessed 27/01/2017).

¹²⁹ République du Sénégal 2013a, 4.

¹³⁰ République du Sénégal 2013a, 4.

¹³¹ République du Sénégal 2013a, 9.

¹³² Monitor Deloitte 2013, 8. Personal notes, “Partenariats Public-Privé et la NASAN: infrastructures, exploitations familiales et autonomisation économique des femmes”, *Cérémonie officielle consacrant le lancement de la Nouvelle Alliance pour la Sécurité alimentaire et la Nutrition (NASAN) au Sénégal et l’ouverture de la conférence annuelle du Système d’Analyse stratégique et de Gestion des connaissances (ReSAKSS)*, Dakar, 12 novembre 2013.

¹³³ *Rapport de l’atelier national de lancement*, 8.

¹³⁴ République du Sénégal 2016b, 53-54.

¹³⁵ Interview with a private partner, Dakar, January 18, 2016.

¹³⁶ Interview with a Senegalese official, phone interview, May 28, 2016.

¹³⁷ République du Sénégal 2013a, 11-12.

¹³⁸ “The aim of this Code is to contribute to the provision of safe and adequate nutrition for infants, by the protection and promotion of breast-feeding, and by ensuring the proper use of breast-milk substitutes, when these are necessary, on the basis of adequate information and through appropriate marketing and distribution”. (http://www.who.int/elena/titles/regulation_breast-milk_substitutes/en/, Accessed 29/08/2016).

¹³⁹ République du Sénégal 2013a, 12. Placed under the direction of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Codex Alimentarius provides “international food standards, guidelines and codes of practice” to guarantee food safety internationally. “While being recommendations for voluntary application by members, Codex standards serve in many cases as a basis for national legislation” (<http://www.codexalimentarius.org/codex-home/en/> Accessed 06/09/2015).

¹⁴⁰ République du Sénégal 2013a, 6-7.

¹⁴¹ This change seems to have been suggested by the New Alliance to facilitate tracking in all countries.

¹⁴² République du Sénégal 2013a, 7. The notion of “internal consultation frameworks” is not defined in the document.

¹⁴³ République du Sénégal 2014b, 9.

¹⁴⁴ Bichard 2014, 24.

¹⁴⁵ For instance, Zena Fruit International processes local fruits that often go bad during the growing season. While Mamelles Jaboot imports milk powder, it buys homegrown cereals to turn them into couscous. The company signs purchase contracts with peasants through which it finances the purchase of inputs and buys the production at the end of the season.

¹⁴⁶ République du Sénégal 2013a, 7.

¹⁴⁷ République du Sénégal, 2014a : 8.

¹⁴⁸ Bichard 2014, 24.

¹⁴⁹ Within the aid donors’ platform in Senegal, there exists a consultative subgroup on food security and rural development. “The extended group’s mission is to implement the principles of the Paris Declaration, improve collaboration and information sharing among TFPs, structure and deepen dialogue with the Government of Senegal [...]” (http://www.undp.org/sn/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=310, accessed 24/01/2017, author’s translation).

¹⁵⁰ It is unclear as to whether CSOs took this decision in a consensual and representative manner, as they differ in their approaches and visions of the NAFSN.

¹⁵¹ The Voluntary guidelines “promote secure tenure rights and equitable access to land, fisheries and forests as a means of eradicating hunger and poverty, supporting sustainable development and enhancing the environment. They were officially endorsed by the Committee on World Food Security on 11 May 2012”, <http://www.fao.org/nr/tenure/voluntary-guidelines/en/> (Accessed 24/06/2015).

¹⁵² République du Sénégal 2013a, 8.

¹⁵³ Although there is a tension between the discourse of agricultural liberalization that Wade proclaims and the maintenance, if not increase, of state intervention in some domains. See Oya and Ba 2013.

¹⁵⁴ For a comprehensive analysis of the NAIP, see Benkahla 2011.

¹⁵⁵ Gabas, Ribier, and Giordano 2015, 22.

¹⁵⁶ <http://www.primature.sn/Le-Fonds-de-Garantie-des.html> (Accessed 07/09/2015).

¹⁵⁷ <http://www.primature.sn/Le-Fonds-souverain-d.html> (Accessed 07/09/2015); <http://www.presidence.sn/youonu-yokkute/presentation.html> (Accessed 07/09/2015).

¹⁵⁸ Lejecos 2014.

¹⁵⁹ Dimé and Ba 2016, 1;6. See also Jamart 2014.

¹⁶⁰ According to the FAO, food security rests on 4 pillars: physical availability (i.e. “adequate supply of food at the national or international level”, access (i.e. sufficient food access at the household level); utilization (i.e. sufficient energy and nutrient intake), and stability of the other three dimensions over time (FAO 2008).

¹⁶¹ The NAFSN organized a panel on the private sector’s role in nutrition at the launching ceremony, in which a consultant from BACDI participated. However, the panel did not spell out concrete strategies to ensure that the private sector effectively improves nutrition outcomes.

¹⁶² A study using household data illustrates that in the tomato sector in Senegal, a highly integrated value chain controlled by a foreign firm for exports generated jobs for temporary seasonal workers or day laborers, contributing to poverty reduction (Maertens, Colen, and Swinnen 2008, 6). According to Maertens et al., “small farmers can gain importantly in vertical coordination schemes with the agro-industry through enhanced access to inputs, reduced production and marketing risks, improved technology and productivity, and ultimately higher incomes” (2008, 5).

¹⁶³ Building on the work of Amartya Sen, Sophia Murphy notes, “those with greater purchasing power get food while those without sufficient income or entitlement go hungry” (2005, 7).

¹⁶⁴ Lee et al. 2012, 12328. According to the authors, “Bilateral oligopolies are the least beneficial to smallholders because of their strict requirements and direct control by lead firms”.

¹⁶⁵ Vorley 2016. Seville et al. also note that “Interestingly, formal chains tend to provide greater income security but not necessarily higher prices” (2011, 42).

¹⁶⁶ Seville et al. 2011, 42.

¹⁶⁷ Vermeulen and Cotula 2010, 5.

¹⁶⁸ <http://www.bilaterals.org/?the-epa-would-liberalize-the&lang=en> (Accessed 27/09/2016).

¹⁶⁹ République du Sénégal 2016a. This strategy is largely based on the document’s previous version.

¹⁷⁰ The state agency in charge of producing and certifying seeds, the Sonagraines, was dismantled in 2000 (Gueye 2014, 19). The law obliges the Senegalese government to provide 40,000 tonnes of certified groundnut seeds per year. As a result, the government must certify 80,000 tonnes of seeds produced by third parties to meet the annual need of 120,000 tonnes. According to state agents, the level of supervision is inadequate because of insufficient means (IRIN 2013). In this context, some subsidized operators who are supposed to distribute certified seeds unscrupulously sell unbin seeds instead.

¹⁷¹ GRAIN claims that Nerica rice “jeopardises the survival of local rice varieties” because peasants may become over-reliant on it (2009, 2). Detractors also contend that Nerica seeds need to be used in conjunction with more chemical fertilizers and pesticides than do peasant seeds. In contrast, proponents of Nerica argue that the variety helps to boost productive yields in the context of rain-fed agriculture. Also, peasants can keep Nerica seeds from one season to another.

¹⁷² For the Senegalese Association of Peasant Seeds Growers (*Association sénégalaise des producteurs de semences paysannes – ASPSP*), peasant seeds are more suited to the needs of farmers. (<http://www.bede-asso.org/accueil-2/terroirs-sources/association-senegalaise-des-producteurs-de-semences-paysannes-aspss/english-communique-de-laspss-association-senegalaise-des-producteurs-de-semences-paysannes-sur-la-semence-ecrenee/>, Accessed 17/03/2016).

- ¹⁷³ Pre-basic seeds are produced from varieties that ISRA selects and conserves because of their special genetic makeup.
- ¹⁷⁴ Gueye 2014, 21. One of the companies authorized to produce pre-basic seeds is Tropicasem, which is also a member of the NAFSN.
- ¹⁷⁵ “The OECD Schemes for the Varietal Certification of Seed Moving in International Trade promote the use of agriculture seed of consistently high quality. Certified seeds are produced - and officially controlled - according to common harmonised procedures in 58 participating countries” (<http://www.oecd.org/tad/code/seeds.htm>, Accessed 06/11/2015).
- ¹⁷⁶ APS 2015.
- ¹⁷⁷ <http://terrethique.org/articles/vers-l-adhesion-du-senegal-au-systeme-des-semences-de-l-ocde/> (Accessed 26/08/2016).
- ¹⁷⁸ However, Senegal, along with other WAEMU countries, is in the process of adopting a regional regulatory framework to authorize GMOs (Diallo 2014). However, this initiative has no direct relation to the NAFSN.
- ¹⁷⁹ Interview with a Senegalese official, phone interview, May 28, 2016.
- ¹⁸⁰ Despite its ambiguities (Ndiaye 2016), analysts have interpreted the law as effectively forbidding GMOs in Senegal.
- ¹⁸¹ An emphyteusis is a “Lease of a duration between nine and ninety-nine years, by which the tenant or emphyteutic lessee acquires an immoveable real right, emphyteusis, in return for an annual rent [...] and an undertaking to make improvements.” (<https://nimbus.mcgill.ca/pld-ddp/dictionary/show/1098?source=ED2EN>, Accessed 28/08/2016). The current legislation authorizes emphyteutic leases in Senegal, but only on the private domain of the state. Town councils that administer land of the national domain only confer usage rights under a condition of exploitation. According to an expert sitting on CNRF’s technical committee, the idea behind granting leases instead of outright property rights consists of avoiding distress sales and permanent land cessions in the hand of strangers to the community, while allowing tenants to take out loans and invest in the land.
- ¹⁸² Personal notes, March 24, 2016 : *Séance académique solennelle : « Le Foncier au Sénégal : Etat des Lieux et Perspectives pour la Modernisation de l’Agriculture »*, organized by Académie Nationale des Sciences et Techniques du Sénégal (ANSTS), Dakar. See also http://www.seneweb.com/news/Societe/macky-sall-laquo-pas-question-d-immatric_n_177924.html (Accessed 25/03/2016).
- ¹⁸³ Diagne 2016.
- ¹⁸⁴ <http://roppa-afrique.org/IMG/pdf/cncr.pdf> (Accessed 12/01/2016).
- ¹⁸⁵ The policy document will have to be translated into laws and decrees to be effective.
- ¹⁸⁶ République du Sénégal, 2016c : 26.
- ¹⁸⁷ République du Sénégal 2014a, 15.
- ¹⁸⁸ <http://www.ipar.sn/Note-de-synthese-no2-processus-d-elaboration-de-la-reforme-fonciere-au-Senegal.html> (Accessed 29/08/2016).
- ¹⁸⁹ République du Sénégal 2016b, 107.
- ¹⁹⁰ De Schutter 2015, 13.
- ¹⁹¹ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/12/02/times-are-hard-and-uncertain-senegal-adopts-climate-smart-agriculture-to-mitigate-effects-of-climate-change> (Accessed 24/05/2016).
- ¹⁹² According to the owner of Laiterie du Berger, a partner of the New Alliance, “The tax on imported milk powder is 7%, while all the taxes associated with collecting local milk add up to 30%.” (Maclean 2016) The high level of taxation represents a bottleneck in milk processing in Senegal. This issue was discussed during NAFSN meetings to no avail.
- ¹⁹³ IPAR 2015.
- ¹⁹⁴ Bichard 2014, 13. In Senegal, three political structures are responsible for supervising food security and nutrition issues. The CLM and the SE-CNSA are both under the authority of the Prime Minister's office. Additionally, the Office of Food Security (*Commissariat à la sécurité alimentaire – CSA*) operates under the aegis of the General Delegation of Social Welfare and National Solidarity (*Délégation Générale à la Protection Sociale et à la Solidarité Nationale – DGPSN*), which is in turn placed under the Presidency.
- ¹⁹⁵ Interview with a Senegalese official, Dakar, December 6, 2015.
- ¹⁹⁶ Bichard 2014, 13.
- ¹⁹⁷ A Canadian official also declared that ASPRODEB’s inclusion shows how the NAFSN was able to foster their entrepreneurial spirit. Despite these reservations, the entry of ASPRODEB in the New Alliance may be commended.

¹⁹⁸ Nabaloum 2015. As well, ICAI observes, “a frustration from businesses that highly-publicised initiatives sometimes do not translate into action. In Ghana, for example, we spoke to three business members about the New Alliance [..]. They were not clear about its agenda or approach and could not identify what difference it was making” (2015, 16).

¹⁹⁹ Interview with a private partner, Dakar, January 4, 2016.

²⁰⁰ Self-reporting seems to be common to all NAFSN participant countries.

²⁰¹ Interview with Canadian officials, Ottawa, April 26, 2016 ; Telephone follow-up, May 13, 2016.

²⁰² Canada conducted a study on its own initiative to measure non-financial realizations of aid donors, but the conclusions were not integrated in the final NAFSN review.

²⁰³ New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition and Grow Africa 2015, 24.

²⁰⁴ The variables the NAFSN uses to measure how smallholders are impacted include: mechanization products and services, production contracts, open market sourcing; technical and managerial training; financial or data services; and input products and services. These categories are not defined.

²⁰⁵ New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition and Grow Africa 2015, 22.

²⁰⁶ New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition 2014, 38-39.

²⁰⁷ According to NAFSN’s global report, “Assessment of progress made in 2014/15 shows that the New Alliance global commitments to advance enabling actions are mostly on plan, with the most tangible support being grants to specific commitments, for example, to assist with infrastructure investments or seed production.” (2015, 2)

²⁰⁸ République du Sénégal 2014b, 18.

²⁰⁹ République du Sénégal 2015a, 112.

²¹⁰ République du Sénégal 2015c, 45, [author’s translation].

²¹¹ Personal communication with private consultant, November 10, 2015.

²¹² November 21, 2015 : *Réunion du comité technique restreint pour l’élaboration de la Stratégie Nationale de Sécurité Alimentaire et de Résilience 2015-2035*, organized by the *Secrétariat exécutif du Conseil National de Sécurité Alimentaire (SE-CNSA)*, Dakar.

²¹³ République du Sénégal 2015b, 8.

²¹⁴ République du Sénégal 2016b, 46.

²¹⁵ République du Sénégal 2016b, 108.

²¹⁶ Interview with a civil society representative, Dakar, November 30, 2015. The same comment applies to PDIDAS. Through a World Bank loan, the government develops land around the Guiers Lake and Ngalam Valley in the Delta for the production of export horticulture. The original allocation key provided that 40% of developed land would be returned to residents and 60% distributed to outside investors. Following opposition to this scheme, each of the nine communes involved with the project now establishes its own distribution ratio.

²¹⁷ *Arrêté fixant les modalités d’application de l’article 373 alinéa 2 du Code général des Impôts*, 19 février 2016. The list of eligible items includes 1) tillage equipment; 2) seeding and fertilization equipment; 3) irrigation equipment; 4) harvesting equipment; 5) storage and transportation material; 6) spare parts; 7) hydro-agricultural facilities, including inputs. This measure is in addition to exemption from customs duties.

²¹⁸ Interview with a Canadian official, Dakar, December 14, 2015.

²¹⁹ Interview with an expert, Dakar, December 14, 2015.

²²⁰ Interview with an APIX agent, Dakar, January 11, 2016.

²²¹ Compagnie agricole de Saint-Louis (CASL), was created and is managed by Arthur Straight Investment, a French firm. Another firm, which is considered domestic, Teyliom Group, was founded by a Senegalese businessman, but now has its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, and is active in several countries in West and Central Africa. Les Grands Moulins de Dakar (GMD) belongs to Groupe Mimran, a powerful company that has its headquarters in Switzerland and also operates in Ivory Coast. Sentenac, through its branch Socas, plans investments through a joint venture with a European company. Hortis is a subsidiary of Greenseed, a US company also present in Mali and Burkina Faso.

²²² The Coca-Cola Company had plans to invest in different African countries under the aegis of the New Alliance. Senegal was mentioned as a “potential” country where the firm could expand its activities, but it does not appear in the country’s Cooperation Framework in the end. <https://growafrica.com/sites/default/files/mou/TCCC%20Source%20Africa%20LOI%20FINAL.pdf> (Accessed May 24, 2016).

²²³ Perhaps with the exception of Teyliom’s branch Continental Food, but it does not seem to have carried out activities since the NAFSN was inaugurated in Senegal.

²²⁴ A local consultant was hired from March 3 to 20, 2015 to canvass private partners. Despite her dedicated work and frequent reminders, companies demonstrated a low level of interest in responding to the questionnaire. Grow Africa then decided to take it on. However, it arrived late in Senegal and had to conduct Skype interviews to complete the survey. APIX and DAPSA were only remotely involved in the data-gathering exercise. During this research, Grow Africa made efforts to collaborate better with the Senegalese government to improve the collection of information.

²²⁵ République du Sénégal 2016b.

²²⁶ République du Sénégal 2014b, 23-24.

²²⁷ République du Sénégal 2015a, 24. In the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition and Grow Africa's joint report, the number of smallholders that the NAFSN reached is estimated at 221,559 (2015, 22).

²²⁸ République du Sénégal 2016b.

²²⁹ République du Sénégal 2016b, 48.

²³⁰ Based on the author's calculations. Investments between November 2013 and June 2016 (US\$126,520,136 + US\$25,776,549 + US\$21,261,032 = US\$173,557,717) were divided by the total amount announced under the NAFSN in Senegal, including companies that have left the New Alliance in the meantime (US\$584,802,838). See Appendix 7 for more details on planned investments. The 2015 Joint Review of Agriculture in Senegal arrives at different numbers, with 82% of investments realized, based on total planned investments estimated at US\$109,014,880 (République du Sénégal 2016b). It is unclear as to whether this amount refers to total planned investments for the last year only, or if it is a result of the low number of respondents to the questionnaire. The Joint Review also provides two different numbers for the level of actual investment in 2015 (US\$21.26 million and US\$23.8).

²³¹ République du Sénégal 2016b, 47. In the 2015 Joint Review of Agriculture in Senegal, the NAFSN evoked for the first time the possibility of cancelling non-realized investment intentions from its portfolio.

²³² During the Spring 2016 campaign, CNT cultivated 636 hectares.

²³³ Nouvelle Alliance pour la Sécurité Alimentaire et la Nutrition 2013, 41.

²³⁴ <http://www.compagnieagricole.com/en/en-savoir-plus.html> (Accessed 03/09/2015). CASL has an agreement with Louis Dreyfus Commodities that it buys at least 50% of the production for commercialization.

²³⁵ The rural council allocated a first slice of 1,500 hectares to CASL on July 4, 2013. On March 15, 2014, the company obtained 533 additional hectares, including 6 hectares to build its plant. The land is distributed in three main blocks, plus the site for the plant. According to the Communal Land Use Plan (*Plan d'Occupation et d'Affectation des Sols – POAS*), the commune of Diama covers 149,000 hectares, out of which 65,557 are primarily reserved for agro-pastoral activities. CASL has also secured 350 hectares in the commune of Gandon, but has not started cultivation activities yet.

²³⁶ In 1988, the central state transformed pioneer land into rural land administered by the rural council, leading many individuals to claim land parcels. Bélières, Bosc, Faure, Fournier, and Losch argue that urban and rural elites who were "seeking to engage in what was thought to be a 'profitable' activity of rice-growing, took part in a major land grab." This land rush resulted in the granting of more than 50,000 hectares in the area of Ross-Béthio between 1987 and 1991 (2002, 12). However, several right-holders on paper do not know where their parcel is physically located because they have left it idle.

²³⁷ An outfall is a canal that falls into a body of water. Outfalls are necessary to drain water from flooded paddy fields. CASL discharges salty water in an outfall that flows into the mouth of the Senegal River.

²³⁸ This number may be higher, as not all firms have specified in the Cooperation Framework if they cultivate land or contract out production. Progress reports do not mention the actual areas of land under cultivation.

²³⁹ While Sunéor is still considered a member of the New Alliance, in recent years the enterprise has been undergoing severe financial difficulties that have forced the Senegalese government to restructure the company and find new buyers. It is unlikely that Sunéor will be able to respect its NAFSN commitments in these circumstances.

²⁴⁰ République du Sénégal 2016b, 65.

²⁴¹ Interview with a private partner, Dakar, January 22, 2016 [author's translation].

²⁴² Interview with a Senegalese official, Dakar, December 18, 2015 [author's translation].

²⁴³ The establishment of conditions for Canada's budget support can be interpreted as a way to give more teeth to the New Alliance.

²⁴⁴ Interview with a private partner, Dakar, January 4, 2016 [author's translation].

²⁴⁵ African Union 2016.

²⁴⁶ “Prorated funding intentions are an estimated portion of the total funding commitment expected to be allocated by mid-2014. Disbursements do not reflect all funds that have been allocated to the countries, but rather funds that have been expended.” (New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa 2014, 22).

²⁴⁷ New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition and Grow Africa 2015, 10.

²⁴⁸ Mulupi 2016. In its Grow Africa report, the WEF underlines that Mozambique, Ghana, Kenya, and Ethiopia have made noticeable improvements in establishing platforms that encourage dialogue between the government and the private sector (2016, 10).

²⁴⁹ Interview with a NGO representative, phone exchange, May 5, 2016.

²⁵⁰ Douet 2015.

²⁵¹ Information on Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast derives from observations and discussions during an event organized by a Senegalese NGO in Dakar. Three panellists were invited to share the experience of the NAFSN in their countries.

²⁵² Jamart et al. 2014, 27.

²⁵³ According to Jamart et al., of the 213 projects that the New Alliance comprised at the time, only 3 were carried out by producer organizations in Burkina Faso, Benin and Malawi (2014, 2-3).

²⁵⁴ Jamart et al. 2014, 10 ; 27.

²⁵⁵ Interview with a civil society representative, phone exchange, May 5, 2016.

²⁵⁶ The most recent initiative in this direction in Senegal is the creation of yet another platform that CAADP and NEPAD recently launched. The platform gathers the government and investors to foster dialogue and increase private investment in agriculture from the current level of 10% to 20% (Dieng 2016).

²⁵⁷ The absence of a clear relationship between aid donor’ partnerships with the private sector on the hand and the reduction of poverty on the other has been documented in other contexts. For instance, ICAI considers that the efforts of Britain’s DFID to engage with businesses do not necessarily catalyze investments or that “too much of the impact of these businesses would have been achieved in any event” (2015, 35). Also, “There is little robust information available to show the impact of business in development on the poor. [...] Although there has been a shift in business attitude towards sustainable development, businesses will still tend to prioritise more profitable activities and areas. They are less likely to target the most remote, marginalised people” (2015, 23). Speaking about the NAFSN in particular, ICAI goes as far as to state that “DFID, as well as its partners, should be ready to embrace and learn from failure” (2015, 32).

²⁵⁸ Vermeulen and Cotula 2010, 95. The work of CECI with onion producers in Senegal is often cited as an example.

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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWED PARTICIPANTS

Stakeholders	Name	#
Senegalese Private Partners	Agroseed	1
	Association Sénégalaise pour la Promotion du Développement par la Base (ASPRODEB)	1
	Coumba Nor Thiam (CNT)	2
	Locafrique	1
	Mamelles Jaboot	1
	SHAM	1
	Zena Exotic Fruits	1
International Private Partners	Compagnie agricole de Saint-Louis (CASL)	2
	Soldive	1
Subtotal		11
Senegalese Governmental Officials	Agence nationale chargée de la Promotion de l'Investissement et des grands travaux (APIX)	1
	Comité de pilotage du PNIA/Primature	2
	Comité régional de suivi environnemental et social de Saint-Louis (CRSE)	1
	Commission nationale de réforme foncière (CNRF)	1
	Direction de l'Analyse, de la Prévision et des Statistiques Agricoles (DAPSA)	1
	Ministère de l'agriculture et de l'équipement rural (MAER)	1
	Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support Systems (SAKSS)	1
	Secrétariat Exécutif du Comité national de sécurité alimentaire (SE-CNSA)	2
Subtotal		10
Technical and Financial Partners	Embassy of Canada to Senegal	1
	Bureau d'appui à la coopération canadienne (BACDI)	1
	Global Affairs Canada (GAC)	2
	United States Agency for International Development (USAID)	3
	Grow Africa	1
	Projet de développement inclusif et durable de l'agrobusiness au Sénégal (PDIDAS)	1
Subtotal		9
Civil Society Organisations	Conseil national de concertation et de coopération des ruraux (CNCR)	1
	Enda Pronat	1
	COPAGEN	1
	African Network on the Right to Food (ANORF)	1
	Action Humaine pour le Développement Intégré au Sénégal (AHDIS)	1
	Conseil des organisations non gouvernementales d'appui au développement (CONGAD)	1
	Institute for Research and the Promotion of Alternatives in Development (IRPAD/Afrique)	1
Experts	Initiative Prospective Agricole et Rurale (IPAR)	2
	Department of Geography, Université Gaston Berger (UGB)	1
Subtotal		10
Local authorities	Municipal Council	2
	Centre d'appui au développement local de l'Arrondissement de Ndiaye (CADL)	1
Villagers	Coumba Nor Thiam (CNT)	9
	Compagnie Agricole de Saint-Louis (CASL)	8
Subtotal		20
Total		60

Two interviews and a number of follow-ups were conducted over the phone. All participants were offered anonymity.

APPENDIX 2. WORKSHOPS AND MEETINGS ATTENDED

- 1) November 12, 2013: *Cérémonie officielle consacrant le lancement de la Nouvelle Alliance pour la Sécurité Alimentaire et la Nutrition (NASAN) au Sénégal*, Dakar.
- 2) July 21-23, 2015: 2^{ème} *Atelier National sur la Mise en oeuvre des Directives Volontaires pour une gouvernance responsable des régimes fonciers applicables aux terres, aux pêches et aux forêts dans le contexte de la sécurité alimentaire nationale*, organized by Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Équipement rural (MAER), Commission nationale de réforme foncière (CNRF), Comité de pilotage sur les DV au Sénégal (COFIL), FAO, IPAR and CNCR, Dakar.
- 3) November 12, 2015 : *Panel sur les méthodes de compensations dans le cadre d'installation de projets convoitant des terres à usage pastoral, forestier et minier*, organized by IPAR, Dakar.
- 4) November 13, 2015 : *Réunion de restitution et de partage sur les perspectives et recommandations issues de la rencontre de Sélingué sur la Convergence des luttes autour de la défense des terres et de l'eau*, organized by Copagen et Forum social sénégalais, Dakar.
- 5) November 17, 2015 : *Termes de référence de l'atelier d'échange sur le projet Recherche participative et plaidoyer sous régional pour un changement de politiques de développement en faveur de la sécurité alimentaire*, organized by Enda Pronat, Dakar.
- 6) November 20, 2015: *Regards croisés sur l'investissement dans l'agriculture en Afrique dans le contexte Post ECOWAP+10*, organized by Centre Africain pour le Commerce, l'Intégration et le Développement (CACID), Secrétariat Permanent de la Plateforme des organisations de la société civile de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (POSCAO), l'Initiative Prospective Agricole et Rurale (IPAR) et Association des Femmes de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (AFAO), en partenariat avec OSIWA, Dakar.
- 7) November 21, 2015 : *Réunion du comité technique restreint pour l'élaboration de la Stratégie Nationale de Sécurité Alimentaire et de Résilience 2015-2035*, organized by the Secrétariat exécutif du Conseil National de Sécurité Alimentaire (SE-CNSA), Dakar.
- 8) November 24-25, 2015: *Workshop on Large-scale Land Acquisitions (LSLAs) and Accountability in Africa*, organized by the International Development Research Center (IDRC), Dakar.
- 9) November 26, 2015: *Strategic Dialogue: For a Responsible Land Tenure Governance*, organized by the Canadian Embassy in Senegal, Dakar.
- 10) November 27, 2015: *Meeting with the Canadian Embassy in Senegal and Grow Africa representatives*, Dakar.
- 11) January 12-14, 2016 : *Améliorer les politiques d'autosuffisance en riz en Afrique de l'Ouest: Défis et opportunités*, organized by IPAR, IDRC, CSEA, CIRES, Dakar.
- 12) March 24, 2016 : *Séance académique solennelle : « Le Foncier au Sénégal : Etat des Lieux et Perspectives pour la Modernisation de l'Agriculture »*, organized by Académie Nationale des Sciences et Techniques du Sénégal (ANSTS), Dakar.

APPENDIX 3: NAFSN'S ENABLING ACTIONS

The NAFSN collaborates with various partners on a number of “global enabling actions” that are carried out in all or most African countries that participate in the New Alliance. In addition to the SSTP discussed above, these actions include the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Extension Challenge Fund, “managed by USAID and supported by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), the Gates Foundation, and the International Fund for International Development (IFAD).”²⁵⁹ This fund promotes “ICT-enabled agriculture extension services” in Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Senegal, and Tanzania.

The Agriculture Fast Track Fund seems to be the only NAFSN-related initiative that directly funds private projects in order to transform ideas into “bankable investments.” Established in the African Development Bank, this “multi-donor trust fund” “has approved 12 project preparation grants, enabling firms to finance project design work such as feasibility studies, market analyzes, environmental impact, and other activities required by banks and other investors to issue commercial loans” for a total of US\$ 6.5 million.²⁶⁰ The NAFSN also continues GAFSP, which received US\$ 573.3 million in new funding in 2012-2013 and US\$ 107 million in 2014.²⁶¹ The NAFSN provides support for the SUN movement, which “Principles of Engagement guide actors as they work in a multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder space to effectively working together to end malnutrition, in all its forms.”²⁶² In Senegal, Canada leads the group of SUN international donors.

In addition, the New Alliance is involved in projects to generate data on the state of agriculture. In partnership with the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research/International Food Policy Research Institute (CGIAR/IFPRI) and the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA), the New Alliance is involved in the creation of a Technology Platform that offers “a set of modeling tools that synthesizes available empirical data to help countries assess the potential impacts of new technologies on yields, income, nutritional, and environmental indicators.”²⁶³ Canada is a donor to CGIAR and FARA. The primary objective of another project, the Global Open Data Initiative for Agriculture and Nutrition (GODAN), is to “help support global efforts to make agricultural and nutritionally relevant data globally available and unrestricted.”²⁶⁴

The New Alliance also supports the Platform for Agricultural Risk Management sponsored by the World Bank, which aims to “identify key risks to food and nutrition security and agricultural development.”²⁶⁵ Lastly, the Global Action Network (GAN) on agriculture insurance is a new addition to the host of Enabling Actions, launched by the International Labour Office (ILO), with the support of USAID.²⁶⁶ GAN is “a community of experts and practitioners that seeks to address the gaps that hinder the responsible and sustainable scaling of agriculture insurance.”

²⁵⁹ <http://agrilinks.org/blog/new-alliance-ict-extension-challenge-fund-two-key-challenges> (Accessed 05/11/2015).

²⁶⁰ New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition 2014, 37.

²⁶¹ New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition 2014, 24. New Alliance for Food Security and Grow Africa 2015, 12.

²⁶² <http://scalingupnutrition.org/about-sun/the-vision-and-principles-of-sun/> (Accessed 21/12/2016).

²⁶³ New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition 2014, 38.

²⁶⁴ <http://www.godan.info> (Accessed 26/09/2016).

²⁶⁵ New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition 2014, 39.

²⁶⁶ <http://www.impactinsurance.org/news/2015/february/launch-global-action-network> (Accessed 26/09/2016).

APPENDIX 4: CANADA'S AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS IN SENEGAL

Name	Executing Agency — Partner	Goal	Start — End Period	Maximum Contribution (\$)	Contribution under the NAFSN (\$)
Programme for Land Use and Economic Development of the Niayes Region (PADEN)	Government of Senegal - Ministry of Economy and Finance	“Increase the income of producers (both women and men) through the development of horticulture and forestry” and improve infrastructure and services available to producers	2009/11/23 – 2018/03/29	19,985,962	19,941,362
Technical Assistance to Land Use and Economic Development of the Niayes Region	Tecslut International Limitée	“Support the Government of Senegal in developing a land use development plan for the Great Coast of Senegal (Niayes region)”	2003/07/18 – 2016/03/31	3,144,590	1,546,746
Economic Development of Casamance Programme (PADEC)	Government of Senegal - Ministry of Economy and Finance	Develop honey, mango, cashew, and banana value chains focusing on revenue-generating activities. “Targets operators (individuals, community groups, and associations), apex organizations, and policies and institutions”	2009/10/06 – 2018/03/29	19,841,144	12,335,871
Support to Rice Production Project for Food Security in Senegal (Bey Dunde)	Alliance agricole internationale (CECI, Socodevi, UPA-DI)	“Increase rice production in the self-managed perimeters of the Senegal River Valley”; improve (1) availability of funds for rice producers to procure inputs; and (2) capacity building for rural organizations to develop effective procurement and marketing services	2010/03/08 – 2014/12/31	6,836,398	805,580
Integrated Support to Food Security and Nutrition (ISFSN)	World Food Programme (WFP)	Reduce undernourishment and chronic hunger, and help the government reconstitute its seed stock of cereals, fruits and vegetables	2012/11/13 – 2015/10/05	20,000,000	20,000,000
Integrated Nutrition Project for the Kolda and Kedougou Regions (PINKK)	Micronutrient Initiative	Promote health through “local production of nutrient-dense as well as nutritionally-fortified foods, micro-finance to support income generating activities for women, and institutional capacity building for local governments and communities”	2015-2020	20,000,000	4,000,000
Total				89,808,094	58,629,559

Data source: <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/cpo.nsf/fWebCSAZEn?ReadForm&idx=oo&CC=SN> (accessed 22/06/2016) and personal communication with Global Affairs Canada, July 7, 2016.

APPENDIX 5: THE NEW ALLIANCE IN SENEGAL: A TIMELINE

In March 2013, Canada invited Senegal to join the New Alliance. After Senegal had decided to integrate with the NAFSN, the government addressed a correspondence to the Chairperson of the African Union Commission in this regard on May 27, 2013. Senegal's accession to the NAFSN was officially announced on June 8, 2013, during the G7 Summit in London. A roundtable on the New Alliance was organized during the visit of Barack Obama to Senegal on June 28, 2013.


Afterward, the Senegalese government carried out a series of consultations to elaborate the NAFSN Cooperation Framework. On July 16, the Prime Minister presided at a workshop with private firms, CSOs, and technical and financial partners. A second workshop was held on July 30 during which private companies were invited to register the difficulties they encountered in the pursuit of their businesses. Monitor Deloitte oversaw the organization of this event. Two subsequent meetings were convened on August 2 and 14, with civil society organizations and international donors respectively. As separate meetings were held with different stakeholders, there was no opportunity for all stakeholders to come together and discuss jointly how the New Alliance could be implemented in Senegal.

A first version of the Cooperation Framework was finalized and submitted to TFPs on September 13. On October 4, the two committees that coordinate NAIP approved an amended version of the Cooperation Framework, which was validated by all stakeholders on October 8. Under the presidency of then Prime Minister Aminata Touré, the Interministerial Council, a body that supervises policy reforms and provides feedback to the President of the Republic, approved the document on October 30, 2013. The program was launched in Senegal on November 12, 2013, during an official ceremony also presided by the Prime Minister.

A consultation workshop was subsequently organized with the private sector on April 30, 2014, to discuss progress on stated goals. The meeting was chaired by the Special Advisor on Agriculture to the Prime Minister and attended by the President of NAIP's technical committee, an agent from APIX, a Canadian Embassy employee, an official from USAID, and representatives of private companies. Another workshop was held with producer and civil society organizations on May 20, 2014, with attendance from roughly the same institutional staff. A meeting was convened on June 17, 2014, to approve the first annual report of NAFSN in Senegal. Mahammed Boun Abdallah Dionne, previously the Minister in charge of executing the PSE, became the new Prime Minister on July 6, 2014. On November 14, 2014, a revised Cooperation Framework spanning the years 2014-2017 was endorsed. Two other meetings were convened with private partners on November 30, 2014, and in March 2015. Grow Africa gathered data for the Second Progress Report over April 2015.

The workshop for discussing and approving the Annual Joint Agricultural Review was organized on October 8-9, 2015. On February 5, 2016, DAPSA and Grow Africa convened a task force to elaborate the questionnaire to be circulated to NAFSN private partners for the coming year. The review for NAFSN's third year in Senegal occurred in June 2016 and was completed in September 2016.

APPENDIX 6: MAIN ORGANIZATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED IN THE NAFSN IN SENEGAL



APPENDIX 7: NAFSN'S BUSINESS SECTORS AND PLANNED INVESTMENTS

Business Sector	Company	Planned Investments (US\$) ²⁶⁷
AGRICULTURAL INPUTS AND PHYSICAL CAPITAL		
Production and sale of seeds	AfricaGraines	2,750,000
	Agrophytex	500,000
	Agroseed	2,326,000
	ASPRODEB	34,200,000
	Hortis	50,000
	Nouvelle Minoterie Africaine (NMA) ²⁶⁸	N.a
	Novel ²⁶⁹	N.a
	SEDAB	800,000
	SIFCA ²⁷⁰	N.a
	Sodefitex ²⁷¹	1,200,000
	Sunéor	20,000,000
TROPICASEM	2,370,000	
Manufacture of fertilizers	Agrophytex	1,910,000
	SEDAB	1,000,000
Production and distribution of agricultural material	ASPRODEB	30,400,000
	Negodis	1,000,000
	Locafrique	4,000,000
Production of cattle feed	Comptoir Commercial Mandiaye Ndiaye (CCMN) ²⁷²	N.a.
	Grands Moulins de Dakar (GMD) ²⁷³	N.a.
	Sentenac	2,000,000
	Vital Agro-industries	1,000,000
Subtotal		105,506,000
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION		
Rice production	Compagnie agricole de Saint-Louis (CASL)	67,310,000
	Comptoir Commercial Mandiaye Ndiaye (CCMN)	N.a.
	CCBM CODERIZ	1,200,000
	Coumba Nor Thiam (CNT)	1,900,000
	Groupe Teylium ²⁷⁴	N.a.
	Vital Agro-industries	54,600,000
	Novel Group	N.a.
Production of other cereals (maize, millet, sorghum and pulses (black-eyed peas, groundnuts, soy)	Agrophytex	320,000
	Belisle solution nutrition inc. – Le Ranch De Ouassadou ²⁷⁵	N.a.
	ETS Adiou Sene	130,000

Business Sector	Company	Planned Investments (US\$) ²⁶⁷
	Groupe Teylium	N.a.
	Nouvelle Minoterie Africaine (NMA)	N.a.
	SEDIMA ²⁷⁶	N.a.
	SHAM Sénégal ²⁷⁷	N.a.
	Sodefitex	N.a.
Fruit production	SHAM Sénégal	N.a.
	Soldive	1,300,000
Animal production (livestock, aviculture and fish farming)	Belisle solution nutrition inc. – Le Ranch De Ouassadou	N.a.
	Générale Alimentaire Africaine (GAA)	1,416,000
	Laiterie du Berger	2,300,000
	SEDIMA	N.a.
	SHAM Sénégal	N.a.
Subtotal		130,476,000
STORAGE, PROCESSING, AND TRANSPORT		
Milk processing	Laiterie du Berger	860,000
Food processing and packaging (flour, tomato paste, fruit juice, etc.)	ASPRODEB	9,500,000
	Générale Alimentaire Africaine (GAA)	1,000,000
	ETS Adiou Sene	30,000
	Export Trading Group	10,000,000
	Mamelles Jaboot	162,000
	PATISEN	80,000,000
	Sentenac	2,000,000
	Société générale d'investissement et de commerce (GIC)	397,000
	Zena Exotic Fruits	1,184,000
	Soldive	854,000
Shelling, crushing and storage of rice, cereals and peanuts	Comptoir Commercial Mandiaye Ndiaye (CCMN)	N.a.
	Copéol	39,000,000
	Coumba Nor Thiam	200,000
	Export Trading Group	10,000,000
	Générale Alimentaire Africaine (GAA)	6,100,000
	Grands Moulins de Dakar (GMD)	N.a.
	Groupe Teylium	N.a.
	SEDIMA	N.a.
	Sodefitex	1,000,000
	Novel Group	50,000,000
	Vital Agro-Industries	1,000,000
Ginning, storage and handling of	Sodefitex	4,400,000

Business Sector	Company	Planned Investments (US\$) ²⁶⁷
cotton		
Processing and sale of seafood products	Sentenac	1,500,000
	SOPASEN	8,540,000
	Pirogue Bleue	320,000
Packaging	Compagnie de Filature et de Sacherie (COFISAC)	2,130,000
Subtotal		230,177,000
TRAINING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES		
Peasant training, pilot farms and support to producer organizations	Agrophytex	330,000
	Agroseed	4,413,000
	Laiterie du Berger	5,300,000
	AfricaGraines	750,000
	Mamelles Jaboot	66,000
	Sodefitex	1,000,000
Insurance Products	Société de réassurance suisse ²⁷⁸	N.a.
Subtotal		11,859,000
Total²⁷⁹		584,802,838

Sources : First Cooperation Framework, Revised Cooperation Framework, *Revue conjointe du Secteur Agricole 2014*, Letters of Intent.

²⁶⁷ NAFSN progress reports in Senegal do not contain information on private partners' actual levels of investment taken individually. Since the beginning of the New Alliance, the following companies have ceased to provide feedback on the advancement of their NAFSN objectives: Belisle solution nutrition inc. – Le Ranch De Ouassadou, Hortis, Grands Moulins de Dakar (GMD), Export Trading Group, AfricaGraines, Comptoir commercial Mandiaye Ndiaye (CCMN), Copeol Senegal, Générale alimentaire africaine (GAA), La Laiterie du Berger, La Pirogue Bleue, Nouvelle Minoterie Africaine (NMA), Patisen, Sedima, Groupe Sentenac, SHAM Sénégal, Suneor, Teyliom, Tropicasem, Vital Agro-Industries.

²⁶⁸ NMA has not disaggregated its investment intentions based on specific items (production of organic soy and seeds). In total, the company pledged to invest US\$7,300,000.

²⁶⁹ Novel planned investments in the production of certified seeds, as well as the cultivation and commercialization of rice, for a total of US\$50,000,000. The company has not provided a detailed breakdown.

²⁷⁰ SIFCA's investment plans are not specified in NAFSN documents.

²⁷¹ In addition to amounts indicated in the table, Sodefitex intends to invest US\$3,300,000 for the renewal of its vehicle fleet and US\$600,000 for a "Quality Safety Environment" certification.

²⁷² CCMN announced investments totalling US\$8,184,838 but has not provided specific amounts by fields of activities.

²⁷³ In total, GMD's investment pledge under the NAFSN amounts to US\$2,500,000.

²⁷⁴ Groupe Teyliom promised to invest US\$5,500,000 in rice production and processing activities.

²⁷⁵ Belisle solution nutrition inc. – Le Ranch De Ouassadou had planned investments exceeding US\$3,000,000.

²⁷⁶ Sedima aimed to spend a total of US\$25,000,000 in different branches of activities.

²⁷⁷ SHAM Sénégal projected to invest US\$1,400,000 in fruit, cereals, and animal production.

²⁷⁸ Société de réassurance suisse's investments projects are not quantified in NAFSN documents.

²⁷⁹ The grand total includes non-available budget lines by fields of activities in the table.

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